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ARTICLES
FEDERALISM AS A SAFEGUARD OF THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Jessica Bulman-Pozen*
States frequently administer federal law, yet scholars have largely over-
looked how the practice of cooperative federalism affects the balance of power
across the branches of the federal government. This Article explains how
states check the federal executive in an era of expansive executive power and
how they do so as champions of Congress, both relying on congressionally
conferred authority and casting themselves as Congress’s faithful agents. By
inviting the states to carry out federal law, Congress, whether purposefully or
incidentally, counteracts the tendency of statutory ambiguity and broad dele-
gations of authority to enhance federal executive power. When states disagree
with the federal executive about how to administer the law, they force atten-
tion back to the underlying statute: Contending that their view is consistent
with Congress’s purposes, states compel the federal executive to respond in
kind. States may also reinvigorate horizontal checks by calling on the courts
or Congress as allies. Cooperative federalism schemes are a more practical
means of checking federal executive power than many existing proposals be-
cause such schemes do not fight problems commentators emphasize—a vast
administrative state, broad delegations, and polarized political parties—but
rather harness these realities to serve separation of powers objectives.
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since Madison celebrated the “double security” provided by fed-
eralism and the separation of powers among the three branches of the
national government, courts and commentators have recognized a strong
analogy between the two great structural principles of our Constitution.1
While they also serve distinct values,2 federalism and the separation of
powers diffuse government authority to prevent the accumulation of ex-
cessive power in any one actor and to encourage different representatives
of the people to monitor the exercises of power by the others.3 The ten-
sion between the state and federal governments, and among the federal
branches, we are told, fosters democratically accountable government.
Although the overarching similarities between federalism and the
separation of powers are widely recognized, there has been little consid-
eration of how these two structures interact. One important account ar-
1. The Federalist No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2. For instance, federalism is also championed for accommodating the diverse
preferences of a heterogeneous society, fostering experimentation, and promoting
democratic participation. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Federalism: A Dialogue 75–106
(1995) (exploring federalism’s functions); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause
and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3–10 (1988)
(same); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1484, 1493–1511 (1987) (reviewing Raoul Berger, Federalism: The Founders’
Design (1987)) (same).
3. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458–59 (1991) (“Just as the separation
and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent
the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power
between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse
from either front.”); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425,
1495 (1987) (arguing analogies between separation of powers and federalism are not
coincidental, for “in separating and dividing power, whether horizontally or vertically, the
Federalists pursued the same strategy: Vest power in different sets of agents who will have
personal incentives to monitor and enforce limitations on each other’s powers”).
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gues that the separation of powers safeguards federalism.4 This Article
suggests the reverse: Federalism safeguards the separation of powers.
Much contemporary separation of powers scholarship laments the
growth of executive power and the lack of vigorous competition between
the federal executive and legislative branches. As commentators have ad-
vanced proposals to check executive power and restore competition, they
have largely overlooked one powerful actor: the states. In recent years,
states have, quite loudly in individual cases but quietly as a matter of con-
stitutional theory, assumed a prominent role in challenging federal exec-
utive power. Because state challenges to the federal executive register as
matters of federalism, it is easy to miss how they also affect the separation
of powers.5 But states often resist executive power in a very particular
way—as champions of Congress, both relying on congressionally con-
ferred authority and casting themselves as Congress’s faithful agents.
Consider, for example, California’s attempt to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions when the Bush Administration declined to do so. The state
insisted that it was attempting to faithfully implement the Clean Air Act
and that the federal executive was abdicating its statutory responsibility.6
Or consider the ongoing dispute between Arizona and the Obama
Administration concerning immigration policy. Arizona has framed its
opposition to federal immigration policy as a challenge not to the federal
government as a whole, but rather to the federal executive branch in par-
ticular. The state maintains that it, rather than the federal executive, is
seeking to execute federal law as Congress intended.7
As these examples suggest, one reason we may overlook how federal-
ism affects the separation of powers is that our dominant understanding
of federalism obscures key features of state challenges. Judicial opinions
and legal scholarship tend to envision the states as separate sovereigns,
resisting federal action from a position entirely outside the federal gov-
ernment. But a prevalent mode of federalism is cooperative federalism, in
which states are charged by Congress with administering federal law.8
4. Bradford Clark, to whom I am indebted for the title of this Article, argues that the
separation of powers safeguards federalism by limiting the number and kinds of federal
laws that may displace state law. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a
Safeguard of Federalism, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1321 (2001); Symposium, Separation of Powers as
a Safeguard of Federalism, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1417 (2008) (responding to Clark’s
article).
5. Indeed, I have not attended to this in prior work, instead treating state challenges
as challenges to the federal government as an undifferentiated whole. See generally Jessica
Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 Yale L.J. 1256 (2009).
While this Article parses the federal government, the granularity of the discussion is still
limited. The branches of the federal government are not unitary entities, nor are the states
or their branches. But, with some exceptions, this Article invokes the three branches and
the states as such, reserving further parsing for future work.
6. See infra Part III.B.3.a (considering California’s challenge).
7. See infra Part III.A.3 (considering Arizona’s challenge).
8. While some accounts limit the term “cooperative federalism” to conditional
preemption schemes, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1992), this
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When we turn our attention to cooperative federalism, we can see the
distinctive way states may safeguard the separation of powers. Cohabiting
a statutory scheme with the federal executive, states frequently challenge
not the raw exercise of federal power, as traditional accounts of federal-
ism would have it, but rather the faithfulness of the executive to the statu-
tory scheme. And, in so doing, they rely on authority granted to them by
Congress. States need not actually be Congress’s faithful agents for them
to claim this mantle and to force the federal executive to respond in
kind. By assigning states a role in executing federal law, Congress has—
often unwittingly—empowered them to provide the sort of check on ex-
ecutive power that it is often unable, or unwilling, to provide directly.
Cooperative federalism schemes are an intriguing safeguard of the
separation of powers for practical as well as theoretical reasons. As this
Article explains, state administration of federal law is a more organic
means of reinvigorating the separation of powers than many existing pro-
posals because instead of fighting problems commentators emphasize, co-
operative federalism schemes harness these realities in the service of
Madison’s vision.
First, cooperative federalism schemes provide a check on federal ex-
ecutive power not despite the expansion of the federal executive branch
but because of it. The very growth of the federal administrative state has
swept states up as necessary administrators of federal law. The more
Congress charges the federal executive with accomplishing, the more
likely it is to also give the states a role in carrying out federal law, and this
positions states to check the federal executive. Cooperative federalism
may thus be a more practical response to the growth of the federal execu-
tive branch than proposals to staunch such growth.
Second, cooperative federalism schemes seize on Congress’s habit of
delegating authority to the federal executive as a means of checking exec-
utive power. Commentators lament that broad delegations enhance exec-
utive power. But when Congress grants administrative authority to both
the states and the federal executive, the more room Congress leaves the
federal executive to maneuver, the more room it also leaves for state resis-
tance. As this perhaps counterintuitive point highlights, Congress need
not intend cooperative federalism schemes to check federal executive
power for them to have this effect; such schemes may give Congress
champions in spite of itself.
Third, cooperative federalism schemes harness partisanship to check
the federal executive. Because there will never be party unity between the
federal government and all fifty states, partisan resistance to the federal
executive will arise even during periods of unified federal government.
Rather than seek to mute partisanship, cooperative federalism thus seizes
Article uses the term in a looser sense to refer to all federal schemes that furnish a role for
the states. For one overview of such schemes, and the many labels used to describe them,
see generally David B. Walker, The Rebirth of Federalism: Slouching Toward Washington
(2d ed. 2000).
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on the polarization of political parties to generate a continual check on
federal executive power. For all of these reasons, cooperative federalism
schemes are a notable antidote to some pressing separation of powers
concerns.
An important caveat is in order. The goal of this Article is to describe
an underappreciated and undertheorized dynamic, not to defend a
strong normative conclusion. States challenge the federal executive in
some of our most contentious policy areas, and their pushback is contro-
versial both in individual cases and writ large. Without seeking to deny
the costs of state resistance, this Article focuses on an overlooked benefit:
furthering separation of powers values. Even with respect to this benefit,
however, the account offered here is partial. In particular, the Article
largely brackets first-order questions about the meaning of the separation
of powers. The separation of powers is an essentially contested concept,9
perhaps even an essentially contradictory concept. In its pristine render-
ing in the Constitution and The Federalist Papers, it embraces opposed poli-
cies: “separated powers, yet shared and overlapping powers; indepen-
dence of branch functions, yet functions that check and balance each
other.”10 And the ends it serves are similarly multiple and competing:
“promoting efficient specialization, but avoiding the tyranny of too much
efficiency,” to name just one tension.11 This Article focuses on checks and
balances, in the form of competition among government actors, and in
the service of democratic responsiveness, deliberation, and thick govern-
mental accountability. While many will agree this is a core constellation
of separation of powers values, those who privilege distinct separation of
powers values may understand state administration of federal law very dif-
ferently.12 And even those who embrace these values may rightly note
9. See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 Proc. Aristotelian Soc’y 167,
169 (1956) (positing that essentially contested concepts are “concepts the proper use of
which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their
users”).
10. Paul Gewirtz, Realism in Separation of Powers Thinking, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
343, 343 (1989).
11. Id.
12. Most notably, proponents of the unitary executive position have suggested that
cooperative federalism may undermine the separation of powers by interfering with the
President’s Article II prerogative to execute federal law. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541,
639–42 (1994) (expounding unitary executive position and suggesting state
implementation of federal law must be subject to President’s supervision); cf. Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922–23 & n.12 (1997) (suggesting Brady Act undermined
separation of powers by commandeering state officers to implement federal law without
presidential control, but distinguishing cooperative federalism schemes). See generally
Evan Caminker, The Unitary Executive and State Administration of Federal Law, 45 U.
Kan. L. Rev. 1075 (1997) (illuminating tensions in unitarian objection to cooperative
federalism schemes). Debates about both the originalist grounding of the unitarian
position and its translation fill volumes. For a small sample of the literature, see generally
Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725 (1996) (arguing values
framers sought to further with separation of powers cut against unitary executive), and
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that other separation of powers values, such as government efficacy and
individual liberty, can be threatened by state contestation. In this initial
foray into the relationship between federalism and the separation of pow-
ers, I do not attempt to weigh all separation of powers values in the bal-
ance, nor do I attempt to defend the desirability of checks and balances
in the first instance. I reserve a more complete, normative assessment for
future work.
Part I provides a brief overview of two main threats to governmental
competition posited by the separation of powers literature: the rise of
executive power in the administrative state and the dominance of politi-
cal parties in motivating government actors. Part II examines the existing
account of how cooperative federalism may serve separation of powers
values and explains that this account is limited because it depends on a
choice by Congress to empower either the federal executive or the states
to administer federal law. Part III sets forth a new theory of federalism as
a safeguard of the separation of powers, explaining how delegation to
both the federal executive and the states helps check federal executive
power and advance congressional authority. After considering how states
exercise power in cooperative federalism schemes, this Part addresses
how concurrent delegation by Congress to the states and the federal ex-
ecutive may limit federal executive power, lead to robust disputes about
which agent is being faithful to Congress, and, in some instances, bring in
the courts or Congress to settle the argument, thereby reinvigorating hor-
izontal checks. Part IV explains why cooperative federalism schemes are a
realistic response to some key threats to the separation of powers.
Ultimately, this Article suggests, we no longer principally have two
independent systems, federalism and the separation of powers, that foster
competition in the service of democratically accountable government,
but rather an interdependent system—not so much a double security as a
redoubled security.
I. THREATS TO THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
Competition among the three branches of the national government
is central to our constitutional design. Indeed, despite the label “separa-
tion of powers,” the Constitution does not perfectly separate the legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial powers. Instead, it fragments such powers to
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L.
Rev. 1 (1994) (arguing framers did not constitutionalize unitary executive but changed
circumstances may require unitary executive). While this Article does not revisit debates
about the unitary executive theory, it evidences skepticism of the strong unitarian position.
Even some committed unitarians, however, may regard delegation to states more favorably
than delegation to other actors beyond the President’s supervision. See Harold J. Krent,
Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority
Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 62, 80–84, 106, 111 (1990) (suggesting
federalism values might justify delegation to states).
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foster checking by each branch of the others’ exercises of authority.13
The framers intended such checking both to forestall tyranny, by denying
to any one branch the power to consolidate government authority in it-
self,14 and to help keep government democratically responsive; when no
one branch might unproblematically claim to represent the popular will,
a thick form of accountability would emerge through interbranch delib-
eration and contestation.15 But two dominant narratives in recent separa-
tion of powers scholarship describe how competition among well-
matched branches of government has become, in many instances, a
parchment aspiration. This Part provides a brief, and necessarily stylized,
overview of these two related narratives: the rise of executive power in the
administrative state and the rise of political parties.
A. Executive Power and Political Parties
A leading narrative in the separation of powers literature of the past
several decades is the rise of executive power. Calling the executive “the
most dangerous branch,”16 and declaring that the executive “subsumes
much of the tripartite structure of government,”17 commentators have
13. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 48, supra note 1, at 308 (James Madison) (“[U]nless R
these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional
control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to
a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained.”); Cynthia R. Farina,
Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum.
L. Rev. 452, 495 (1989) (“[O]ur tendency to describe the constitutional scheme as one of
‘separation of powers and checks and balances’ can be misleading. This conventional,
bifurcated phrasing obscures the fact that the latter represented, for those who drafted and
defended the Constitution, a vital and indispensable aspect of the former.”).
14. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 578 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss,
Place of Agencies] (“[Checks and balances] seek[ ] to protect the citizens from the
emergence of tyrannical government by establishing multiple heads of authority in
government, which are then pitted one against another in a continuous struggle . . . .”).
15. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 183–86 (1991)
[hereinafter Ackerman, We the People] (arguing each branch represents the people in a
different and partial way and such fragmented representation ensures no single branch
can unproblematically claim mantle of the people); Flaherty, supra note 12, at 1821–25 R
(arguing framers reconceptualized accountability as province of all three branches).
16. Flaherty, supra note 12, at 1727; see also, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Checks and R
Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 123, 125 (1994) (“[T]he
framers’ factual assumptions [that the legislature would be the most dangerous branch]
have been displaced. Now, it is the President whose power has expanded and who
therefore needs to be checked.”).
17. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314, 2316 (2006); see also, e.g., Farina,
supra note 13, at 523 (“[T]he dominance of the executive that has followed the delegation R
of regulatory power cannot be squared with the original commitment to separation of
powers . . . .”); William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably
Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 505, 506 (2008) [hereinafter Marshall, Eleven
Reasons] (“[The] expansion in presidential power has created a constitutional imbalance
between the executive and legislative branches, calling into doubt the continued efficacy of
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suggested that the three branches have become unbalanced, with the ex-
ecutive exercising a predominant, and often unchecked, role.
Central to this story is the emergence of the administrative state.
Since the New Deal, administrative agencies have carried out vast
amounts of highly discretionary policymaking under broad delegations
from Congress. They make rules under open-ended directives, such as
setting air quality standards “requisite to protect the public health,”18 and
conduct adjudications under equally open-ended directives, such as
granting licenses “if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be
served thereby.”19 Even when Congress delineates their substantive man-
dates more particularly, agencies retain significant enforcement discre-
tion, effectively allowing them to shape the content of federal law.20
While the consolidation of power in administrative agencies might
not pose a serious separation of powers concern if the President,
Congress, and judiciary simply channeled interbranch competition
through the administrative apparatus,21 commentators worry that, within
this apparatus, the President exercises outsized control. In particular, the
President shapes administrative action through regulatory review22 and
the structure of separation of powers set forth by the Framers.”). See generally Bruce
Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic (2010) [hereinafter Ackerman,
Decline and Fall] (arguing aggrandizement of executive branch threatens our
constitutional tradition); Peter M. Shane, Madison’s Nightmare: How Executive Power
Threatens American Democracy (2009) (arguing executive is unchecked and
unbalanced).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006); see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457,
472 (2001) (rejecting nondelegation challenge to this provision). These rules dwarf the
volume of traditional legislation. See Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “The
Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696, 752 (2007)
(“[A]gencies adopt roughly ten times as many rules each year as Congress adopts
statutes.”).
19. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (2006); see NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943)
(rejecting nondelegation challenge to this provision).
20. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control
Delegated Power, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1443, 1453 (2003).
21. See, e.g., Strauss, Place of Agencies, supra note 14, at 579–80 (arguing vitality of R
separation of powers in administrative law inheres in competition among branches to
control administration). But see, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1231, 1248–49 (1994) (rejecting this logic
and declaring post-New Deal administrative state unconstitutional outright).
22. Regulatory review took off with President Reagan’s Executive Order No. 12,291, 3
C.F.R. 127 (1981), revoked by Executive Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted
as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006), and every President since Reagan has retained a
policy of regulatory review. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, reprinted as
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (President Clinton); Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191
(2007) (President George W. Bush), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113
(Feb. 4, 2009); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (President
Obama); see also Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the
Regulatory State, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1260, 1267 (2006) (stating OMB review “provides a
sitting President, Democrat or Republican, with a powerful tool to promote his political
agenda”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2285–90
(2001) (discussing President Clinton’s use of regulatory review).
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directives,23 and the bureaucracy has become increasingly politicized,
with Presidents selecting greater and greater numbers of agency political
appointees, most of whom are not Senate-confirmed.24
As many have noted, what is most remarkable about the rise of exec-
utive power in the administrative state from a traditional separation of
powers perspective is that the other two branches have largely empow-
ered the executive.25 For instance, Congress did not object to President
Nixon’s Reorganization Plan 2, which created the powerful Office of
Management and Budget, and it codified President Carter’s requested
civil service reforms, which “resulted in a tremendous boost for presiden-
tial power.”26 More generally, Congress has continued to delegate
broadly even as presidential control over administration has increased. At
the same time, courts have invalidated Congress’s attempts to counterbal-
ance broad delegations, such as the legislative veto.27 And the judiciary
has curtailed its own review of administrative action. Most notably, the
Supreme Court in Chevron assigned to the executive branch the authority
to determine the meaning of ambiguously worded statutes, suggesting it
was desirable for agencies to pursue the President’s regulatory agenda in
interpreting such statutes.28 The Court has also limited judicial review of
agency action by imposing strict limits on standing.29
23. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 22, at 2290–99 (describing how President Clinton R
employed directives). See generally Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does the
President Have Directive Authority over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 Fordham L. Rev.
2487 (2011) (discussing scholarly debate on President’s directive authority).
24. David J. Barron, Foreword: From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative
Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1095, 1121–32 (2008). The
President now appoints approximately 4,000 individuals, and the number of non-Senate-
confirmed appointments nearly doubled between 1964 and 1992. Id. at 1123.
25. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, Democracy Without a Net? Separation of Powers and
the Idea of Self-Sustaining Constitutional Constraints on Undemocratic Behavior, 79 St.
John’s L. Rev. 293, 306–07 (1995) (“The rise of the administrative state . . . gave the
President immense and previously unknown power. Yet this power was not seized, but
handed over.”); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law,
118 Harv. L. Rev. 916, 953–54 (2005) (“[C]ongressional abdication of legislative power to
the executive is at least as much of a problem as congressional self-aggrandizement.”).
26. David E. Lewis & Terry M. Moe, The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Levers
of Presidential Control, in The Presidency and the Political System 367, 384 (Michael
Nelson ed., 9th ed. 2010); see Terry M. Moe, The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The
Presidential Advantage, in The Presidency and the Political System, supra, at 425, 442–43
(discussing Nixon’s Reorganization Plan 2).
27. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944–59 (1983); see also, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 721–36 (1986) (striking down Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act because it allowed
Comptroller General, who is removable by Congress, to direct budget cuts).
28. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66
(1984).
29. In particular, the Court’s narrow framing of the requirement that litigants show
an actual or imminent personal injury makes difficult challenges to many forms of agency
action that affect society more diffusely. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 559, 564 (1992) (“‘[S]ome day’ intentions . . . do not support a finding of the ‘actual
or imminent’ injury that our cases require.”).
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Congressional and judicial decisions to empower the executive thus
highlight a deeper concern about the separation of powers: The branches
are not engaged in sustained, vigorous competition. A second key narra-
tive of recent separation of powers scholarship provides an explanation
for the rise of executive power that follows from this lack of interbranch
competition. As Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes have described in par-
ticular detail, political competition has come to be channeled not
through the legislative and executive branches as such, but rather
through political parties.30 The degree and kind of interbranch competi-
tion thus depends significantly on whether party control of the House,
Senate, and presidency is divided or unified, and on the relative cohesive-
ness and polarization of political parties.
The “separation of parties, not powers” thesis helps explain why the
rise of executive power is not principally a story of an imperial presidency
wresting control of administration, but rather one of Congress empower-
ing the executive. Simply put, while Congress has many tools to check the
executive—appropriations riders, advice and consent, oversight hearings,
and investigations, to name a few—it often is not motivated to deploy
them.31 Indeed, because party politics shape legislators’ incentives, legis-
lators frequently accomplish their own policy goals by conferring substan-
tial authority on the executive branch.32 While in a sense, delegation thus
enhances both congressional and executive power, it is the executive who
is empowered to act unilaterally. Moreover, broad delegations remain in
place even when future Congresses would wish to revoke them, enabling
Presidents to achieve their policy ends through the administrative appara-
tus in times of divided government.33
30. See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not
Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311 (2006). For other accounts noting the centrality of party
politics, see Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order 8–32 (2003); Bruce Ackerman,
The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 644–52 (2000) [hereinafter
Ackerman, New Separation]; Gardner, supra note 25, at 312–14. R
31. See, e.g., Levinson & Pildes, supra note 30, at 2343–47 (describing how Congress R
checks executive less during periods of unified government); cf. Josh Chafetz, Congress’s
Constitution, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 715, 723–24 (2012) (describing how Congress
underutilizes tools to enhance its power).
32. See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost
Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers 121–62 (1999) (showing
Congress delegates substantially more, and more discretionary, authority to executive in
times of unified government). See generally D. Roderick Kiewiet & Mathew D. McCubbins,
The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (1991)
(describing, more generally, how delegation serves congressional ends).
33. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game,
80 Geo. L.J. 523, 539 (1992) (“Because statutes have an indefinite life, a broad delegation
in 1937 (when the preferences of Congress and the President were congruent on many
issues) still had important consequences in 1987 (when the political preferences of
Congress and the President were very different).”); Levinson & Pildes, supra note 30, at R
2359–60 (“When government divides, Congress is confronted with large measures of
executive policymaking that it would substantively reject if it could. [But] Congress will
have limited recourse against an opposite-party executive empowered by broad
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B. Proposals to Restore Checks and Balances
Many commentators focused on threats to robust competition
among the branches of the federal government, and particularly on the
rise of executive power, have looked to Congress and the courts to restore
checks and balances. Martin Flaherty and Abner Greene have advocated
the revival of the legislative veto,34 while David Schoenbrod has argued
against congressional delegation in the first instance,35 and Cynthia
Farina, William Eskridge, and John Ferejohn have called on the courts to
reassert themselves in statutory interpretation by, for example, limiting
Chevron deference.36
Other commentators have concluded that it is hopeless at this point
to turn to the legislature and judiciary. Some have proposed internal
checks on the executive branch. Focusing on foreign affairs, for instance,
Neal Katyal has advocated a set of mechanisms including review of gov-
ernment action by different agencies and enhanced civil-service protec-
tions for agency employees.37 Bruce Ackerman has recently proposed a
“Supreme Executive Tribunal” of presidentially nominated, Senate-
confirmed individuals who would provide legal advice binding on the
President.38 Maintaining that parties, rather than powers, are key to com-
petition among government actors, Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes
have advanced proposals to restore the checks and balances that party
unification undermines. Among other things, they suggest fostering
greater independence for the bureaucracy and fragmenting or moderat-
ing political parties.39
delegations.”); see also Greene, supra note 16, at 182–84 (describing “entrenching R
presidential veto”); Kagan, supra note 22, at 2248 (exploring how President Clinton turned R
to bureaucracy to achieve policy goals when faced with hostile Congress).
34. See Flaherty, supra note 12, at 1832–34 (“[T]here is every functionalist reason to R
look favorably upon the legislative veto, at least with regard to those functions championed
at the Founding.”); Greene, supra note 16, at 179 (“If the Court were to . . . validate the R
legislative veto, it could both limit presidential power . . . and assure strong
accountability . . . .”).
35. David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the
People Through Delegation 20 (1993) (“The Supreme Court should declare
unconstitutional all delegation of legislative power . . . .”).
36. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 33, at 547–51; Farina, supra note 13, at 456–67. R
37. Katyal, supra note 17, at 2322–42. R
38. Ackerman, Decline and Fall, supra note 17, at 143–52. R
39. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 30, at 2375–85; see also, e.g., Greene, supra note 16, R
at 156 (“[I]ndependent agencies still represent an important curtailment of presidential
power.”); William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys
General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 Yale L.J. 2446, 2469–78 (2006)
(suggesting making Attorney General an independent officer). Still other commentators
conclude that we live in “an age after the separation of powers” and that politics and public
opinion, not law, are the only meaningful checks on executive power. Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic 4 (2010).
While political constraints are significant, this Article focuses on checks within the
separation of powers framework broadly defined.
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While these proposals may be attractive, they are unlikely to succeed.
Those focused on changing the behavior of Congress and the courts
seem especially bound for failure: Broad delegations are here to stay, but
the legislative veto is firmly interred, and Chevron deference is not going
away. As they stand now, independent agencies are not so independent,40
and those seeking to further insulate the bureaucracy from presidential
supervision are fighting an uphill battle.41 The more innovative proposals
for fostering internal executive branch checking and for moderating po-
litical parties are also unlikely to be realized, while less ambitious propos-
als are unlikely to furnish effective checks.42
But there may be another, more realistic check on the federal execu-
tive that commentators have largely overlooked. In recent years, some of
the most spirited challenges to executive authority have come not from
within the federal government, but rather from the states. Although these
challenges are quite visible in individual cases, they have received little
attention as a constitutional practice. This is not only because separation
of powers scholarship trains its focus on the federal government, but also
because many of the most powerful state challenges do not fit easily
within traditional accounts of federalism that focus on state sovereignty.
Instead, they emerge within cooperative federalism schemes, in which
Congress charges not only the federal executive but also the states with
carrying out federal law.43 Insofar as such schemes represent a relatively
novel mode of federalism, however, they also represent a means of safe-
guarding the separation of powers. In cooperative federalism schemes,
states frequently challenge not federal authority per se, but rather the
federal executive’s particular exercise of its statutory authority. And they
are able to level such challenges because they, too, have been charged by
Congress with carrying out federal law. Through cooperative federalism,
Congress has thus, both purposefully and incidentally, empowered a
cadre of politically motivated actors to challenge the executive even when
Congress itself cannot or will not do so.
This is not to suggest cooperative federalism is a panacea for separa-
tion of powers problems. In particular, several of the proposals noted
40. See, e.g., Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party
Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 459, 460–61 (2008)
(describing presidential control of independent agencies).
41. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138,
3147 (2010) (rejecting double for-cause limitations on President’s removal power as
“contrary to Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the President” and a violation of
President’s constitutional authority to oversee faithfulness of officers who execute the
laws).
42. See, e.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1688,
1743 (2011) (reviewing Ackerman, Decline and Fall, supra note 17) (“To put the point R
bluntly, it is nearly impossible to imagine a Congress and President working together to
pass legislation creating a Supreme Executive Tribunal.”).
43. See supra note 8 (defining “cooperative federalism” broadly for purposes of this R
Article).
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above respond to the federal executive’s overweening role with respect to
national security and foreign affairs, areas where states are less likely to
provide an effective check.44 Moreover, for those seeking only to con-
strain federal executive action, the check cooperative federalism fur-
nishes may in many instances seem perverse, as it can force the federal
executive to act as well as stop it from doing so. But the executive exer-
cises its substantial authority over domestic law through both action and
inaction. Cooperative federalism responds to the unilateral, discretionary
nature of the executive’s power, and it does so by injecting competition
into federal statutory schemes.
II. EXCLUSIVE DELEGATION
While commentators focused on the rise of federal executive power
and the dominance of political parties have largely overlooked the role
states might play in safeguarding the separation of powers, a few scholars
have attended to how cooperative federalism schemes may serve separa-
tion of powers values, suggesting state administration of federal law fos-
ters certain separation of powers goals insofar as Congress may choose
either the states or the federal executive to administer federal law. After
explaining the basic contours of the exclusive delegation theory, this Part
probes its limitations before Part III explores how congressional empow-
erment of both the states and the federal executive may safeguard the
separation of powers.
A. The Existing Account
In a provocative symposium essay, Roderick Hills suggests that coop-
erative federalism may promote separation of powers values by allowing
states to compete with the federal executive branch for authority to im-
plement federal law.45 Hills is not concerned about checking executive
power. Instead, his account focuses on the distinct, but related, objective
of ensuring that federal laws are implemented by officials who are both
faithful to the purposes of such laws and independent from Congress.46
First, Hills argues, Congress may empower states, rather than the fed-
eral executive branch, to implement federal law when it believes they will
be more faithful agents. He suggests this choice may be driven by the
composition of each type of government body and its attendant institu-
tional culture. In his view, state governments are densely populated by
elected politicians, while the federal executive branch houses loosely su-
pervised appointed policy experts.47 Second, he posits, competition be-
44. But cf. Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64
Stan. L. Rev. 289, 296–310 (2012) (considering role of states and localities in national
security programs); infra note 83 (discussing USA PATRIOT Act). R
45. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism in Constitutional Context, 22 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 181, 181 (1998) [hereinafter Hills, Constitutional Context].
46. Id.
47. Id. at 186–87.
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tween the federal executive branch and the states allows Congress to en-
sure that whatever administrator it has selected is in fact faithful to its
purposes: “Congress can discipline either type of organization—federal
agency or non-federal politicians—by threatening to replace one with the
other if it misbehaves.”48
While Hills is not focused on cabining executive power, Philip
Weiser has picked up on his account to argue that Congress’s selection of
states to administer federal law (or its threat to replace the federal execu-
tive with the states) may help to keep executive power in check.49 Read
together, Hills and Weiser thus suggest one way federalism may safeguard
the separation of powers in an era of executive dominance: States may
check the federal executive by taking its place in administrative schemes
or by lurking in the wings as plausible replacements.
B. Limits of the Existing Account
This account of how cooperative federalism may serve separation of
powers values is intriguing but quite limited. First, Congress rarely dele-
gates authority exclusively to the states. Instead, cooperative federalism
programs involve varying and complicated combinations of state and fed-
eral authority. Second, while in theory Congress could threaten to re-
place the federal executive with the states, a variety of practical problems
make it difficult for Congress to credibly so threaten. Underlying the ac-
count of exclusive delegation, moreover, is the premise that Congress will
be worried about executive branch infidelity or overreaching, but this
often does not aptly describe congressional motivation. Focusing on a de-
liberate choice by Congress to empower the states instead of the federal
executive, or to threaten to do so, thus only begins to describe how coop-
erative federalism may safeguard the separation of powers.
1. Cooperative Federalism in Practice. — Congress generally does not
grant states exclusive authority to execute federal law. More commonly,
cooperative federalism schemes preserve a significant role for the federal
executive even when they empower the states. Any suggestion that
Congress is actively checking federal executive power by replacing the
federal executive with the states is thus limited as a descriptive matter.
Congress calls upon states to execute federal law in a variety of ways.
Most significantly, although it may not commandeer the states,50
Congress may encourage them to implement a federal regulatory pro-
48. Id. at 190.
49. Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 663, 707–19 (2001).
50. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“The Federal Government may
neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command
the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a
federal regulatory program.”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (“The
Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program.”).
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gram.51 First, Congress may rely on its spending power to condition
states’ receipt of federal funds on compliance with federal criteria. The
Medicaid program, for instance, offers states financial assistance to pay
for medical treatment for needy persons if state plans comply with certain
requirements.52 Second, Congress may offer states the choice of regulat-
ing according to federal standards or having state law preempted by fed-
eral regulation. Such conditional preemption is the basis for the nation’s
major environmental statutes, among other federal schemes.53 Often
Congress combines conditional grants and conditional preemption, pro-
viding funding to cover state costs of implementing federal law.54
These cooperative federalism programs do not tend to represent an
either-or choice by Congress of the federal executive or the states. To the
contrary, when Congress invites the states to implement federal law, it
typically also provides a significant role for the federal executive, for in-
stance charging it with promulgating regulations with which the states
must comply or giving it authority to approve state plans. Thus, state
Medicaid programs must comply with requirements imposed by the
Department of Health and Human Services.55 The Clean Air and Water
Acts require the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish na-
tional ambient air quality standards and national emission and effluent
standards with which state implementation plans must comply. The EPA
also approves state plans and retains the authority to promulgate a fed-
eral plan for any state that does not submit an acceptable plan.56
Congress may also call on states to enforce federal statutes. While
state implementation of federal regulatory regimes is a relatively recent
development,57 state enforcement of federal law has a long pedigree.58
51. New York, 505 U.S at 167–68.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006); see also, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34,
49–50 (1981) (upholding Medicaid regulations).
53. E.g., Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 1201–1328 (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7642 (2006).
54. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 672 (2006) (authorizing grants to states to implement
Occupational Safety and Health Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7405, 7544 (authorizing grants to states
to implement Clean Air Act).
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(4) (requiring state plans to include “such methods of
administration . . . as are found by the Secretary to be necessary for the proper and
efficient operation of the plan”).
56. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1316, 1318(c), 1342; 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409–7411. The EPA plays a similar
role in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6926, and the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1253. See generally Robert L. Fischman,
Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 179, 188–204
(2005) (describing environmental cooperative federalism schemes).
57. The New Deal provided a role for states in fiscal programs such as Aid to Families
with Dependent Children, but regulatory cooperative federalism began in earnest in the
1960s. Weiser, supra note 49, at 669. But cf., e.g., Symposium on Cooperative Federalism, R
23 Iowa L. Rev. 455 (1938) (documenting earlier instances).
58. For instance, the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized state justices of the peace and
magistrates to arrest those suspected of violating federal criminal law, Judiciary Act of 1789,
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Today, a variety of civil federal laws confer enforcement authority on the
states,59 and Congress has also provided for deputized state or local of-
ficers to perform certain functions of federal immigration officers.60
As when Congress grants states authority to implement federal regu-
latory programs, when it grants states authority to enforce federal law, it
tends not to replace federal with state actors but instead to confer en-
forcement authority on both. Sometimes such authority is entirely dis-
tinct, with the federal and state actors independently entitled to enforce
the provision.61 Other times, Congress gives states a secondary role. For
instance, many statutes authorizing states to sue to enforce federal law
require the state to give advance notice to the relevant federal agency,
provide for federal agency intervention, and forbid the state from pro-
ceeding if the same alleged violation is the subject of a pending action by
the federal agency.62 In some cases, Congress authorizes states to enforce
only a federal agency’s regulations, rather than the statute itself,63 or it
grants states the authority to enforce federal law only under the supervi-
sion of the federal executive.64
In addition to conferring implementation and enforcement author-
ity, Congress includes states in the execution of federal law in more dis-
§ 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91, a delegation that remains in effect today, 18 U.S.C. § 3041 (2006). The
Volstead Act authorized state officials to sue on behalf of the United States to restrain
violation of criminal prohibition laws. National Prohibition Act, Pub. L. No. 66-66, ch. 85,
tit. II, §§ 22–23, 41 Stat. 305, 314–15 (1919).
59. For instance, state attorneys general may bring civil causes of action to protect free
access to abortion clinics, 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(3), as well as to enforce a variety of federal
consumer protection and environmental laws, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1194(a) (2006) (regulating
flammable fabrics); id. § 1264(d) (hazardous substances); id. § 2073(b)(1) (consumer
products); 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365 (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Clean Air Act). See generally Margaret H.
Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 698 (2011) (exploring how
state enforcement of federal law furthers state power).
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006) (permitting deputized state officers to perform
functions of immigration officers related to “investigation, apprehension, or detention of
aliens in the United States”).
61. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 248 (authorizing both federal and state actors to sue to protect
access to abortion clinics).
62. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1264(d) (authorizing state enforcement of hazardous substance
regulations, subject to procedural requirements); id. § 2073 (providing procedural
requirements for suits to enforce product safety standards).
63. The recent Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
prohibits states from enforcing its provisions against national banks or federal savings
institutions but authorizes states to enforce regulations promulgated by the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau against those same entities upon notice to the Bureau. Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 1042(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 2012–14 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5552).
64. For instance, Congress authorizes state and local officers and employees to
investigate, apprehend, or detain aliens only pursuant to agreements with the federal
executive. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). Such agreements, which are made at the discretion of the
federal executive, subject state officers to federal supervision. Id.
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crete ways. Some statutes require65 or permit66 state and local officials to
report information to federal agencies. Others grant state entities the au-
thority to make interstitial decisions or findings for the federal executive
branch.67 And a variety of administrative entities include both state and
federal members.68
In short, when Congress gives states a role in executing federal law, it
tends to delegate not exclusively but rather concurrently: States may imple-
ment federal law by conforming to standards set by the federal executive;
state and federal agencies may implement the same regulatory provisions
or enforce the same statutes; or state officials may execute federal law
under the supervision of a federal agency. Such integration makes sense
given Congress’s reasons for granting authority to the states. Sometimes,
Congress may do so to discipline the federal executive or because it be-
lieves the states will be more faithful to its purposes.69 But Congress often
turns to the states for a host of practical reasons: because they have rele-
vant expertise; because they have in place an administrative apparatus
that the federal government lacks; because relying on states will be
cheaper or will foster experimentation; because states can be “force mul-
tipliers” that amplify enforcement of federal law; because congressional
delegations fight to protect existing state programs from federal preemp-
tion; because of a more diffuse interest in devolution—in other words,
for countless reasons not related to disciplining the federal executive. If
65. E.g., 23 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2006) (requiring reporting of traffic-related fatalities and
injuries); 42 U.S.C. § 6933 (2006) (hazardous waste sites). Such reporting requirements
are often framed as mandatory, but the Court refrained from deciding whether they
constitute commandeering in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 917–18 (1997).
66. Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, for example, requires that
states implement federal immigration law only pursuant to an agreement, but carves out
from this requirement the communication of information regarding an individual’s
immigration status to the federal government. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(A); see also id.
§ 1373 (providing federal executive branch “shall respond” to inquiries by state or local
government agencies seeking to ascertain an individual’s immigration status for any
purpose authorized by law).
67. For instance, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 requires the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, a state entity, to recommend medical
loss ratio standards to the Department of Health and Human Services. Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 2718, 124 Stat. 119, 137 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg).
68. E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2009aa-1(a)(2)(B) (2006) (providing for state and federal
members of Delta Regional Authority).
69. Even when Congress turns to the states because it distrusts the federal executive, it
may not cut out the latter entirely but rather may grant states an interstitial or redundant
role to empower them to check the federal executive. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act
seems to reflect a distrust of the federal executive’s protection of consumers, but it does
not substitute state for federal actors; instead, it grants both authority to enforce provisions
of federal law and also scales back preemption of certain state laws. See Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1042(a)(1), 124 Stat.
1376, 2012 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552) (authorizing states to enforce
provisions of Dodd-Frank Act and related regulations); id. §§ 1044–1046 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 25b) (reducting preemption of state law for certain entities); see also infra
note 79 (discussing Dodd-Frank Act). R
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anything, most cooperative federalism programs suggest a greater trust of
the federal executive than of the states insofar as they give the former a
supervisory role. Focusing on exclusive delegation to the states thus cap-
tures only a small piece of cooperative federalism.70
2. Restricted Competition. — Hills and Weiser posit not only that
Congress may replace the federal executive in the first instance, but also
that Congress may harness competition between state and federal actors
to keep the federal executive honest by threatening to replace it “if it
misbehaves.”71 While attractive as a theoretical matter, this hypothesis is
also limited as a practical matter.
Once Congress parcels out authority to administer federal law, it is
very difficult to change the recipient of the delegation—and because the
federal executive knows this, congressional threats to replace it will have
limited force. To change its delegate, Congress first must monitor its cho-
sen agent to determine whether it is faithfully executing the law, but, as
Hills acknowledges, “Congress, as a whole, obviously cannot monitor the
thousands of agency actions that dozens of federal agencies take every
year.”72 Even if Congress devolves this role to committees and subcom-
mittees, which flag infidelity for the entire legislature,73 Congress will
need to pass a new law to transfer authority from federal to state actors,
70. Congress may also authorize states to execute federal law by approving interstate
compacts. When Congress either authorizes in advance or approves an agreement between
two or more states, the agreement becomes federal law under the Compact Clause. U.S.
Const. art. I, § 10; see Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981) (“[W]here Congress has
authorized the States to enter into a cooperative agreement, and where the subject matter
of that agreement is an appropriate subject for congressional legislation, the consent of
Congress transforms the States’ agreement into federal law under the Compact Clause.”).
Even though such compacts circumvent the federal executive, it does not appear Congress
has relied on them to discipline the federal executive. As an initial matter, under Supreme
Court precedent, most interstate agreements do not require congressional approval, so
Congress is often not involved. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893)
(limiting application of Compact Clause to agreements “directed to the formation of any
combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach
upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States”). Further, those compacts
that do exist are largely state-initiated agreements that are summarily approved by
Congress. Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of
Permanency, 49 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 13–14 (1997). In addition, while compacts may allow states
to entirely replace the federal executive in carrying out federal law, even compacts may
generate state-federal integration. See, e.g., Krent, supra note 12, at 80 n.55 (discussing R
overlapping responsibilities of Northwest Power Planning Council and Bonneville Power
Administration).
71. Hills, Constitutional Context, supra note 45, at 190; see also Weiser, supra note 49, R
at 667 (“[C]ooperative federalism . . . enables Congress to discipline federal agencies by
threatening to delegate regulatory authority to the states.”).
72. Hills, Constitutional Context, supra note 45, at 191. R
73. Oversight by committees and subcommittees raises separate concerns. Not only
may these committees have different views from the Congress that enacted the governing
laws, but they also may not represent the current Congress. For an important empirical
investigation, see generally DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 20 (exploring how committees R
may attempt to push agencies to depart from their statutory mandates).
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but the obstacles that constrain all lawmaking, including the presidential
veto, will make this a challenge. Moreover, once the federal executive has
been assigned a function—and the states have not—it will be practically
quite complicated to switch this function to the states, which likely will
not have built up the requisite capacity. Indeed, the reverse is also true
and is a well-known source of state power in cooperative federalism
schemes: When the states have assumed a particular role in executing
federal law, federal agencies often cannot take over even when the states
have not been complying with their mandate and the federal agency is
statutorily authorized to replace them.74 All of these factors blunt
Congress’s ability to credibly threaten to delegate authority to a different
actor.
Even apart from the practical difficulties attending such threats,
Congress may not be motivated to make them. Hills and Weiser posit an
active and engaged Congress, ready to vindicate its prerogatives against
the federal executive. But, for the reasons sketched in Part I, this is often
not an apt description. Congress tends to design cooperative federalism
schemes for purposes other than checking federal executive power, and it
may be no more interested in such checking after it has conferred au-
thority on the executive branch in the first instance. This is not to say that
Congress can never be roused to check the federal executive. But, as its
continuing practice of broad delegation underscores, checking executive
power is generally not Congress’s priority.
In sum, granting administrative authority exclusively to the states is
only one, quite limited way in which cooperative federalism may safe-
guard the separation of powers. A more robust account must consider
statutory schemes that empower both the states and the federal executive,
and, concomitantly, schemes that are driven not by Congress’s desire to
check the federal executive but by a variety of other interests. Indeed,
because open-ended delegations are a foremost source of federal execu-
tive power in the administrative state, those concerned about an un-
checked executive should explore whether cooperative federalism
schemes may serve separation of powers values even when they confer
significant authority on the federal executive. The next Part begins to
develop such an account.
III. CONCURRENT DELEGATION
To understand how state administration of federal law safeguards the
separation of powers, one must consider not only congressional grants of
authority to either the states or the federal executive, but also grants of
74. See, e.g., Fischman, supra note 56, at 192 n.37 (noting EPA’s threats to revoke R
approval of state environmental programs are weakened by its lack of capacity to run
programs itself); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 Mich. L.
Rev. 813, 868–69 (1998) (describing instances in which federal agencies could not assume
responsibilities of states not complying with federal instruction).
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authority to both the states and the federal executive. This wider lens bet-
ter captures existing cooperative federalism schemes and also highlights
how states may challenge executive power and advance congressional au-
thority even absent a deliberate congressional design.
Such a wider lens also better captures federal-state competition.
While the exclusive delegation account hinges on competition as the
mechanism for safeguarding the separation of powers, it actually contem-
plates quite limited competition. There is competition at the initial mo-
ment when Congress is deciding whether to delegate to a state or federal
actor. After that moment, however, there is no on-the-ground competi-
tion as state and federal actors fight about how to execute the law, but
only a sort of hypothetical competition in the shape of Congress’s estima-
tion of whether the actor it has not selected would in fact do a superior
job. And, with a supine Congress, this hypothetical competition may be
just that: hypothetical. In contrast, concurrent delegation to the federal
executive and the states might appear less competitive because Congress
is empowering both of two possible agents rather than pitting them
against one another in the first instance. But the arrangement that seems
more cooperative will often be more combative. Concurrent delegation
frequently yields intense, ongoing competition as the federal executive
and the states dispute how to carry out federal law in the course of
execution.
Part III.A describes how concurrent delegation to state and federal
actors, in a variety of configurations, gives rise to three main forms of
competition. States may diverge from federal executive policy, curb the
federal executive’s own implementation of the law, or goad the federal
executive to take particular actions. Part III.B considers how these prac-
tices safeguard the separation of powers in an era of predominant execu-
tive power. Not only do states engaging in diverging, curbing, and goad-
ing check federal executive authority, but they also champion
congressional authority and may reinvigorate horizontal checks and bal-
ances when they turn to Congress or the federal courts to enforce their
view of the law against that of the executive.
A. State Powers
States exercise three main forms of power in cooperative federalism
schemes by virtue of the authority granted to them by Congress to admin-
ister federal law together with the federal executive: diverging, curbing,
and goading. Although this tripartite division is not a perfect one—each
practice includes diverse types of actions, and the three bleed into one
another at the edges—it offers a basic framework through which to ex-
plore how concurrent delegation may safeguard the separation of
powers.
1. Diverging. — Cooperative federalism schemes frequently grant
states and the federal executive parallel authority to administer federal
law, and states may use this authority to administer the law differently
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from their federal counterparts. Congress may affirmatively grant both
state and federal actors the authority to execute a particular law, as, for
example, when it authorizes both the federal executive and state attor-
neys general to enforce a statute.75 Or the grant of authority to state and
federal actors may be more haphazard. For instance, Congress may give
states a choice between regulating pursuant to federal instruction or leav-
ing the federal executive to regulate for them, and some states may elect
to regulate themselves while others choose to remain subject to the fed-
eral executive’s authority.76 As this suggests, diverging will typically look
different in the enforcement and implementation contexts. Enforcement
is likely to be cumulative, with both the state and the federal executive
enforcing the law in the same jurisdiction, while implementation is likely
to be alternative, with either the federal or the state authority implement-
ing the statute in a particular jurisdiction. In either instance, however,
states may diverge from the federal executive’s administrative policy.
Of the three mechanisms explored here, diverging is likely to be the
most familiar. Indeed, in recent years, federalism scholars have increas-
ingly focused on the benefits of overlapping state and federal authority
over particular areas, in contrast to domain-centric dual federalism.
Robert Schapiro’s theory of polyphonic federalism, for instance, cele-
brates the ability of overlapping state and federal power to foster innova-
tion, dialogue, and protection for individuals.77 Erwin Chemerinsky has
similarly championed overlapping state-federal authority in the form of
“federalism as empowerment.”78 But because such accounts focus on gen-
erating multiple approaches to particular problems, they tend to consider
state administration of state law and federal administration of federal law
in the same substantive area. Attention to the separation of powers in-
stead pushes us to consider state and federal administration of the same
75. See supra notes 58–64 and accompanying text (discussing grants of authority to R
both states and federal executive to enforce federal law).
76. For instance, state officials implement the Occupational Safety and Health Act in
roughly half of the states, while a federal agency implements the Act in the other half. State
Occupational Safety and Health Plans, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/
osp/index.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
77. Robert Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: Toward the Protection of Fundamental
Rights (2009); cf. Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism:
Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L.J. 1035, 1048 (1977) (celebrating dialectic
between state and federal courts as means of articulating rights); Robert M. Cover, The
Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 639, 646, 682 (1981) (identifying “complex concurrency” as dominant American
structure of courts, and arguing “the inner logic of ‘our federalism’ . . . [points] to the
social value of institutions in conflict with one another”).
78. Erwin Chemerinsky, Enhancing Government: Federalism for the 21st Century
145–247 (2008); see also, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism:
The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1796
(2008) (examining values of state-federal overlap with respect to environmental law);
William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 108 (2005)
(same).
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federal law. While, from a federalism perspective, state administration of
state law may largely have the same benefits as state administration of
federal law, from a separation of powers perspective, the two situations
differ, for it is only in the latter that states are agents of Congress.79
The Clean Air Act offers a helpful example of diverging. The Act
delegates significant authority to the federal executive branch to deter-
mine which pollutants to regulate and to what extent. Yet while the Act
generally preempts state vehicle emission standards, it permits California
to diverge from federal policy—by adopting standards that are at least as
protective of public health and welfare as the federal standards—if the
state obtains a waiver from the EPA. In a reversal of the usual standard,
the EPA must grant a waiver unless the agency makes certain findings.80
The statute thus effectively gives California and the EPA parallel authority
to implement this provision of federal law,81 and other states may adopt
79. That said, Congress may in some instances endorse state administration of state
law as a means of serving federal objectives. For instance, state consumer protection laws
have traditionally been broadly preempted by regulations of the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC), but the recent Dodd-Frank Act expressly scales back such OCC
preemption, arguably casting state law as a species of federal law. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1044–1045, 124
Stat. 1376, 2014–17 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b) (eliminating preemption of
state law for national bank subsidiaries, agents, and affiliates, and amending preemption
standard for state consumer financial laws). The federal agency and the states may thus in
some sense both be considered Congress’s agents in regulating consumer protection even
when the states are carrying out state law. As the theory of federalism as a safeguard of the
separation of powers would predict, state attorneys general and the OCC are engaged in a
lively debate about the proper interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act. See, e.g., Dave Clarke,
States Say Bank Regulator Still in Their Way, Reuters (June 28, 2011, 4:46 PM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2011/06/28/us-financial-regulation-occ-idUSTRE75R6WA20110628
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing letter to OCC by forty-eight state
attorneys general arguing proposed OCC rule seeks to preempt state law more broadly
than Congress intended).
More generally, one might argue that Congress embraces state law as a means of
furthering its objectives to the extent it does not preempt state law that occupies the same
field as federal law. While analysis of this dynamic is case-specific, there is not a clear line
between state administration of state law and state administration of federal law but rather
a continuum. Indeed, the example of diverging taken up in the text, California’s
regulation of vehicle emissions pursuant to the Clean Air Act, is technically an example of
Congress’s not preempting a state’s lawmaking authority. Because Congress has imposed
specific conditions on the state’s exercise of this authority, however, California may be
understood to be carrying out federal law.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (2006); see H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 23 (1977), reprinted
in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1101 (noting provision “would require the Administrator in
most instances to waive the preemption . . . with respect to California’s standards”); see
also infra notes 128–134 and accompanying text (discussing waiver denial). R
81. See, e.g., Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F.
Supp. 2d 295, 347 (D. Vt. 2007) (stating California emissions standard “becomes a motor
vehicle standard of the government, with the same stature as a federal regulation”). See
generally Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1097, 1113–28 (2009) (discussing California’s status under Clean Air Act).
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California’s standards in lieu of the EPA-promulgated standards.82 By
granting both the EPA and California the authority to regulate vehicle
emissions pursuant to federal law, the Clean Air Act establishes California
as a competitor to the EPA. In contrast to situations in which Congress
authorizes only the federal executive to implement federal law, this
shared responsibility leaves the state and the federal executive to offer
diverging visions of how to implement federal law as they go about doing
so.
2. Curbing. — States may also flex their muscle in cooperative feder-
alism regimes by curbing the federal executive’s ability to implement fed-
eral law as it chooses. In particular, when states carry out part of a statute
under the supervision of a federal agency, they may rely on this role to
interfere with the agency’s execution. States are able to do this precisely
because they are the federal executive’s subordinates; even when they are
subject to its direction and oversight, they may frustrate its agenda.
Whereas states’ power to diverge stems from their ability to regulate more
or less independently of the federal executive, their power to curb stems
from the executive’s inability to regulate independently of them.83
In its gentler forms, curbing may arise when states force the federal
executive to back off of strong regulatory positions or to grant conces-
sions ex ante about how the law will be implemented. While states have
some ability to haggle up front, curbing may be especially likely after state
participation in a federal scheme is underway. Once the federal executive
has come to depend on states to play a particular role—such as determin-
ing individuals’ eligibility for federal funds or implementing pollution
controls—and has therefore not established the ability to do so itself
(even when the statute contemplates federal authority as a backstop),
states will have a greater ability to force the federal executive to make
concessions or, in extreme cases, to undermine federal executive
policy.84
82. 42 U.S.C. § 7507.
83. Curbing is a prevalent form of uncooperative federalism, a phenomenon I have
elsewhere explored. See generally Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 5. But, as the label R
suggests, uncooperative federalism focuses on the relationship of the states to the federal
government as a whole, not to its component branches. In contrast, consideration of the
separation of powers calls attention to state resistance to the federal executive’s
implementation of federal law, rather than state resistance to the underlying law itself.
Even some challenges to the underlying law may, however, be best understood as
directed at the federal executive. For instance, state resolutions concerning the USA
PATRIOT Act limit state cooperation not with the entire Act, but rather with particular
provisions that seem to give unbridled authority to the executive branch; these resolutions
focus on the way the law may be implemented. See, e.g., Legis. Res. 27, 23d Leg., 1st Sess.
at 2–3 (Alaska 2003) (prohibiting state agencies from cooperating with investigations,
surveillance, or detention absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity).
84. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54
Md. L. Rev. 1183, 1216 (1995) (“Because, as a practical matter, the federal government
must rely on the state governments to carry out federal environmental policy, state
concerns and preferences will continue to receive careful consideration . . . .”). As this
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A strong example of curbing is the way states halted Social Security
disability reviews in the early 1980s. Congress amended the Social
Security Act in June 1980 to require the Social Security Administration
(SSA) to conduct continuing reviews for beneficiaries whose disabilities
might not be permanent.85 The newly elected Reagan Administration
adopted a vigorous review policy, and the termination rate quickly rose to
nearly fifty percent.86 In the words of one commentator, “What had been
conceived by Congress in 1980 was deliberate invigoration of a review
procedure that had been too feeble to have much effect. What was set in
motion in 1981 was more like a purge.”87
States brought this “purge” to a halt. Since the inception of the disa-
bility insurance programs, Congress had given states a role in carrying out
disability reviews.88 The 1980 amendments reaffirmed states’ role while
making clear that they were subordinate to the federal executive: Condi-
tional upon the approval of the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
states had only a partial role in a broader scheme (making the initial,
reviewable determination as to disability), and this limited role was itself
suggests, curbing is primarily a regulatory phenomenon. State power to enforce, rather
than implement, federal law will tend to yield diverging (or possibly goading, discussed
next), not curbing, because in most cases states will not be a constituent part of the federal
executive’s enforcement apparatus but rather independent enforcers. Nonetheless, in
some instances, the federal executive might rely on state enforcement as a practical matter
so that a state’s decision not to pursue certain actions effectively interferes with the
executive’s enforcement strategy. To the extent this occurs, it is best understood as
curbing. Cf. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 5, at 1282–84 (discussing federal R
government reliance on state enforcement of state drug laws).
85. Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 311, 94 Stat.
441, 460 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 421).
86. Donald E. Chambers, The Reagan Administration’s Welfare Retrenchment Policy:
Terminating Social Security Benefits for the Disabled, 5 Pol’y Stud. Rev. 230, 232 (1985).
Among other things, the Administration began the review process earlier than Congress
had called for. Martha Derthick, Agency Under Stress: The Social Security Administration
in American Government 36 (1990). Meanwhile, the SSA changed its policy from
investigating for improvements to conducting a de novo decision on current disability. 20
C.F.R. § 416.994 (1981).
87. Derthick, supra note 86, at 36; see also id. at 34–36 (noting Congress estimated R
savings of $10 million in first four years, while Reagan Administration projected savings of
$3.45 billion in six years); Chambers, supra note 86, at 232 (arguing Congress intended R
1980 amendments simply to further better administration, but Reagan Administration
hurried them “as a major cost-cutting venture”); Editorial, Why Drive Troubled People
Crazy?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1983, at A26 (“For more than a year, the Social Security
Administration has been using a Congressional order to purge malingerers from the
disability program as a license for bureaucratic mayhem.”). But see Jerry L. Mashaw,
Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims 174 (1983) (“There is
currently much evidence . . . that SSA, responding to congressional concern, is constraining the
supply of disability benefits.” (emphasis added)); id. at 59–60 (discussing conflicting
impulses in 1980 amendments).
88. Somewhat ironically, as it turned out, states had been brought into the
administration of the federal program as a concession to opponents of disability insurance,
who believed states would have no interest in expanding the federal program. Derthick,
supra note 86, at 39. R
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subject to regulations crafted by the Secretary “in such detail as [the
Secretary] deems appropriate.”89 Even though they were directed and
overseen by the federal executive, states were able to curb the agency’s
policy because the agency relied on their service. Led by Massachusetts
and New York, over half of the states suspended disability reviews by 1984,
and the review process ceased until Congress enacted new legislation.90
Charged with administering part of a federal scheme, the states engaged
in curbing, deploying their statutory power to thwart the policy of the
federal executive.91
3. Goading. — States may also use authority granted to them by
Congress in cooperative federalism schemes to push the federal executive
to take certain actions it otherwise would not have. The defining feature
of goading is that the states are able to harness their federal statutory
authority to drive the federal executive’s own agenda. Goading is thus
similar to curbing inasmuch as it represents states shaping the federal
executive’s own actions, but it pushes the executive in the opposite direc-
tion: Curbing ramps down regulation or enforcement, while goading
ramps it up.
Weak forms of goading may arise when states use enforcement pow-
ers granted to them by Congress to nudge the federal executive to bring
actions it had declined to pursue or when they rely on their role in a
regulatory scheme to push the federal executive to implement a program
in a more aggressive way. Such goading may be best understood as a form
of agenda setting with bite. While states may influence the federal execu-
tive’s agenda in many ways—including petitioning for rulemaking, lobby-
ing, and using their position as separate sovereigns to set an example—
there is special force to their actions when they rely on concurrent fed-
eral authority. In such cases, states exercise federal statutory authority to
instantiate their view; they are not mere supplicants but empowered ac-
tors in their own right. And because they are relying on the same law that
the federal executive administers, it is more difficult for the federal exec-
utive to shrug off their actions as occupying a distinct sphere. When, for
instance, in 1999, New York’s then-Attorney General Eliot Spitzer an-
89. Social Security Disability Amendments § 304(a), 94 Stat. at 453–54 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 421(a)).
90. Edward D. Berkowitz, Disabled Policy: America’s Programs for the Handicapped
142–43 (1987).
91. Although this Article does not revisit debates over the unitary executive theory,
see supra note 12, the practice of curbing underscores that a formalistic view of the R
President’s authority may actually render the unitarian objection a rather limited one. The
leading unitarian account posits that presidential supervision over state administration
renders such administration constitutional even though the President does not have the
power to appoint or remove state officers. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 12, at 639. But R
see Caminker, supra note 12, at 1085–100 (challenging logic of this position). But some of R
the most powerful state challenges to presidential control over administration occur when
states are subject to federal oversight, as when states thwarted disability reviews. This
observation underscores a familiar point: The formal power to control an actor does not
necessarily entail the practical power to do so.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-3\COL301.txt unknown Seq: 26 14-MAR-12 7:25
484 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:459
nounced that he would sue coal-burning power plants under a provision
of the federal Clean Air Act that the EPA had not sought to use, the
agency quickly came to rely on Spitzer’s theory to bring an action against
more than one hundred plants.92 By calling attention to how the EPA
could enforce federal law more aggressively—and by stating he would do
so pursuant to his own congressionally conferred authority—Spitzer
pushed the agency to assume a stronger position. Diverging, in other
words, may yield goading.
Congress may also confer special authority on states to goad a federal
agency to deploy its rulemaking or enforcement powers. The recent
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, for in-
stance, provides that the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection “shall
issue a notice of proposed rulemaking whenever a majority of the States
has enacted a resolution in support of the establishment or modification
of a consumer protection regulation by the Bureau.”93
A strong instance of goading, which we might call reverse comman-
deering, is playing out across the country right now in the realm of immi-
gration law, as states seize on mandatory provisions of federal law to at-
tempt to drive federal executive action. Following Arizona’s lead,
numerous states have passed laws that challenge the enforcement of fed-
eral immigration law and seek not only to supplement federal enforce-
ment with state enforcement, but also to force the federal executive itself
to take more action.94 They do so by incorporating into state law provi-
sions of federal law that involve a role for the states.
Section 2 of Arizona’s law, S.B. 1070, is illustrative. This section re-
quires state officers to determine the immigration status of arrestees by
verifying such status with “the federal government pursuant to 8 United
States Code section 1373(c),”95 a provision of federal law that directs the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to respond to immigration-sta-
92. Lemos, supra note 59, at 743–44. R
93. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1041(c)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2011 (2010) (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1551).
94. The Ninth Circuit approved an injunction against part of Arizona’s law, and the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 369 (9th
Cir.), cert. granted 80 U.S.L.W. 3090 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2011) (No. 11-182). States that have
followed Arizona’s lead include Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, and Utah. See Beason-
Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, Pub. Act No. 535, 2011-3 Ala.
Adv. Legis. Serv. 677 (LexisNexis); Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of
2011, No. 252, 2011 Ga. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 252 (West) (to be codified in
scattered sections of Ga. Code Ann. tits. 13, 16, 17, 35, 36, 42, 45, 50); Act of May 5, 2011,
Pub. L. No. 171, 2011 Ind. Legis. Serv. 171 (West) (to be codified in scattered sections of
Ind. Code tits. 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 22, 34, 35); Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act, ch. 21,
2011 Utah Legis. Serv. 21 (West) (to be codified in scattered sections of Utah Code Ann.
tits. 76, 77), as amended by Act of Mar. 15, 2011, ch. 18, 2011 Utah Legis. Serv. 18 (West).
Each of these state statutes is also the subject of ongoing litigation. See, e.g., United States
v. Alabama, Nos. 11–14532–CC, 11–14535–CC, 2011 WL 4863957, at *6 (11th Cir. Oct. 14,
2011) (granting preliminary injunction against parts of Alabama’s law).
95. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (2010).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-3\COL301.txt unknown Seq: 27 14-MAR-12 7:25
2012] FEDERALISM AS A SAFEGUARD 485
tus inquiries from states and localities.96 By incorporating a provision of
federal law that provides a role for states, section 2 thus effectively re-
quires not only state, but also federal, actors to follow its prescriptions.97
As a matter of law, section 2 commandeers the federal executive in a
relatively limited way: DHS will have to respond to a greater number of
immigration-status inquiries. The state law does not purport to require
DHS agents to do anything after they provide information about an indi-
vidual’s status, nor could it. But this is the elephant in the room. As a
practical matter, section 2 is likely to force DHS to remove individuals it
has identified as being unlawfully present. Once DHS has confirmed such
an individual’s status, that is, it will be difficult for the agency to refuse
additional state “cooperation” and to ignore the individual’s presence in
the United States.98 The state law thus capitalizes on a federal statutory
provision to attempt to compel the federal executive to enforce federal
law more aggressively.
The sense in which section 2 may significantly, though indirectly,
compel federal executive action underscores how goading may occur
even absent a federal law that expressly permits states to make demands
on federal agents. As suggested above,99 Congress often includes states in
federal schemes in ways that lend them soft power to force federal execu-
tive action. States will be able to exercise such power based on the
broader political climate, the politics of a particular issue, and the extent
to which the federal executive relies on the states in a particular scheme,
among other factors. With the Arizona law, the politics of immigration
are paramount.
Arizona’s goading of the federal executive may also illustrate another
general dynamic. Ironically, it is a provision of the state’s law that casts
the state as subordinate to the federal executive that effectively compels
federal executive action. Indeed, Arizona may well have incorporated 8
U.S.C. § 1373 in order to save the state law from preemption: Arizona
does not purport to independently determine individuals’ immigration
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (2006) (providing DHS “shall respond to an inquiry by a
Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or
immigration status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose
authorized by law, by providing the requested verification or status information”).
97. See Brief for Appellee at 50, Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (No. 10-16645), 2010 WL
5162512 (arguing Arizona’s law “harnesses the federal apparatus in pursuit of a scheme
over which the federal government would have no control, and would proceed without
regard to federal practice and policy”).
98. See Arizona, 641 F.3d at 379 & n.12 (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“[While] federal authorities are free to refuse additional cooperation offered by the
state officers, and frankly to state their lack of interest in removing the illegal alien . . . ,
they might be subject to criticism for not enforcing federal immigration law . . . .”); cf.
Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State
and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1819, 1853–58 (2011)
(discussing state arrests as means of putting pressure on federal government).
99. See supra text accompanying note 92. R
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status but simply follows the federal agency’s determination.100 So, too,
various provisions of federal law that appear designed to subordinate
state powers to federal agency powers may paradoxically generate goad-
ing. For instance, many provisions conferring enforcement authority on
state attorneys general require them to provide advance notice of any suit
to the relevant federal agency.101 While this may give the federal agency
an opportunity to influence or halt state proceedings, it may also do more
or less the opposite, pushing the federal agency to pursue cases to which
it would not have devoted its resources.
B. The Separation of Powers
Through the state practices of diverging, curbing, and goading, con-
current delegation helps safeguard the separation of powers in an era of
executive dominance by checking federal executive power, advancing
congressional authority, and spurring the other two branches of the fed-
eral government to review exercises of federal executive power.
1. Checking the Federal Executive. — Diverging, curbing, and goading
each check the power of “the most dangerous branch” over the adminis-
trative state. The way in which states limit federal executive power is prob-
ably most apparent with respect to curbing, which involves state interfer-
ence with the executive’s ability to enforce or implement the law as it
chooses. When states halted disability reviews, for instance, they thwarted
the Reagan Administration’s ability to carry out the Social Security Act as
it wished. Goading also limits executive power in a straightforward man-
ner. Here, states do not stop federal action—they force it—but they
nonetheless curtail the executive’s ability to proceed as it chooses.
Arizona’s immigration law, for example, would push the Obama
Administration to enforce federal immigration law more aggressively
than it has elected to do.
Diverging, although perhaps not immediately recognizable as a
source of checking, also constrains federal executive power in significant
ways. When states diverge from federal executive policy, they generate
competition on the ground. Even if their departure from federal policy is
not motivated by a spirit of dissent, states may effectively challenge the
federal executive’s power simply by modeling a different way of adminis-
tering the law. When California promulgates different emissions stan-
dards from the EPA, for instance, it deprives the latter of its monopoly on
decisions about how to carry out the law. As this suggests, from the per-
100. See, e.g., Appellants’ Opening Brief at 1, Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (No. 10-16645),
2010 WL 5162518 (“The Arizona Legislature carefully crafted the Act to ensure that
Arizona’s officers would [act] in compliance with existing federal laws . . . .”); see also Brief
of Amici Curiae Congressmen Ed Royce et al. in Support of Appellants and Reversal at 6,
Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (No. 10-16645), 2010 WL 5162511 [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curae
Congressman Ed Royce et al.] (stating Arizona law “incorporates by reference, in virtually
all significant respects, the actual provisions of federal law”).
101. See supra note 62 (citing statutes). R
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spective of executive power, the simple fact that the federal executive is
not the only administrator matters. Congress’s concurrent grant of au-
thority to the states and the federal executive curtails federal executive
power in the first instance. Indeed, a state with concurrent authority may
limit federal executive power even when it does not in fact diverge from
the federal executive’s policy. The federal executive’s control over how to
enforce or implement the law is typically an important source of power,
but the grant of such authority to another actor—even if this actor does
not challenge executive branch decisions—strips the federal executive of
this unilateral prerogative.
What may be most notable about the check cooperative federalism
schemes furnish on executive power is that it operates even when, per-
haps especially when, Congress has delegated broadly or crafted an am-
biguous statute. When Congress enacts an open-ended provision and
grants administrative authority only to the federal executive, the latter’s
power is at its height. But when Congress grants administrative authority
to both the states and the federal executive, an open-ended grant of au-
thority may instead stimulate competition by empowering states to chal-
lenge the federal executive. In fact, the broader the delegation, or the
more ambiguous the statute, the more room there may be for states to
contest federal executive power.
The Clean Air Act, for instance, confers substantial discretion on the
EPA,102 and Presidents have consistently sought to influence the agency’s
implementation of the Act’s open-ended provisions.103 But precisely be-
cause of the open-endedness of the grant of authority to the EPA
Administrator to determine whether emissions should be regulated be-
cause “in his judgment [they] cause, or contribute to, air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,”104
this grant becomes not only a source of federal executive power but also a
site of competition when California is also authorized to make a determi-
nation pursuant to the standard.
So, too, in the Social Security Act amendments of 1980, Congress
had a broad goal and granted substantial discretion to the SSA to see it
through.105 Yet Congress empowered not only the federal agency but also
the states to administer the Act.106 While the SSA was clearly dominant in
the venture, the inclusion of the states established them as rivals in inter-
102. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001)
(considering but rejecting nondelegation challenge to Clean Air Act).
103. See generally Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office
Oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn
1991, at 127 (exploring impact of White House review of EPA rulemaking and
decisionmaking).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006).
105. Derthick, supra note 86, at 79, 82 (noting broad discretion granted to SSA); see R
supra note 87 (suggesting ambiguity of Congress’s purposes in Act). R
106. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing state role in determining R
disability).
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preting and implementing the Act and thus limited the degree to which a
broad grant of authority enhanced federal executive power.
The federal executive also typically has great discretion as to how to
enforce federal law.107 Here, its power is not necessarily the result of a
decision by Congress to delegate broadly, but often the absence of any
decision by Congress to cabin executive discretion.108 But Congress need
not directly limit federal executive discretion for a concurrent delegation
of enforcement authority to state and federal actors to have this effect. As
the Arizona immigration litigation underscores, even when the states
have a small part in the statutory scheme, their inclusion may transform
what would normally be a source of federal executive discretion into a
source of competition.
Indeed, as elaborated below,109 even ultimately unsuccessful state at-
tempts at diverging, curbing, and goading may check federal executive
power. In resisting state efforts to shape its own actions or to depart from
its policies, the federal executive may be forced to provide public reasons
for its actions and to justify its preferred policies in a way it would
not were it the sole administrator of a given law. Because states are co-
administrators, that is, the federal executive must respond seriously to
their challenges. In this sense, states check the federal executive not only
by directly limiting its power but also by refining the exercise of, and
shaping the discourse around, this power. By generating public account-
ing and deliberation, state checks can begin as well as end a
conversation.110
2. Advancing Congressional Authority. — Cooperative federalism
schemes do not affect the federal executive’s power in isolation, but
rather vis-a`-vis Congress. In some sense, any challenge to the executive
alters the balance of power among the branches of the federal govern-
ment: Simply by checking federal executive power, state administration of
federal law affects the relative power of the executive and Congress. But
cooperative federalism schemes also influence the relationship between
the federal legislative and executive branches more directly, as states chal-
lenging the federal executive through diverging, curbing, and goading
tend to advance congressional authority in two closely related respects.
First, states rely on their federal statutory authority to launch their
challenge. Their role in checking federal executive power is thus surpris-
107. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 827–35 (1985) (describing executive
branch decisions not to pursue enforcement action as presumptively unreviewable).
108. See id. at 833 (“Congress may limit an agency’s exercise of enforcement power if
it wishes, either by setting substantive priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an agency’s
power to discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue.”).
109. See infra Part III.B.2–3.
110. Cf. Larry D. Kramer, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison, Popular
Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 Val. U. L. Rev. 697, 736
(2006) (“[T]he use of a constitutional check is not meant to conclude a dispute. It is
meant to begin one: to force the kind of public debate needed for ‘the reason of the
society’ to emerge and coalesce.”).
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ing from the perspective of traditional accounts of federalism. Such ac-
counts suggest that states’ strongest claims follow from their status as sep-
arate sovereigns. Yet in cooperative federalism schemes, states effectively
relinquish arguments from their status as autonomous entities and in-
stead make claims based on their congressionally conferred authority.
Rather than rely on their sovereign status to challenge the federal govern-
ment writ large, that is, states rely on the power granted to them by one
part of the federal government, the legislature, to contest the power of
another part, the executive. Their opposition comes from inside the fed-
eral scheme rather than from purely outside of it.
Second, when state and federal policies clash, states cast themselves
as faithful agents of Congress, seeking to carry out a statute as Congress
intended, in contrast to a wayward federal executive branch. States there-
fore not only owe their ability to contest federal executive policy to
Congress in the first instance, but also take up Congress’s mantle as they
duke it out with the federal executive, emphasizing the primacy of the
legislative branch. Their challenges thus concern the separation of pow-
ers as much as federalism.
When a state and the federal executive disagree about how to exe-
cute federal law, the state’s strongest claim of right comes from an appeal
to the underlying statute. It is immaterial what is actually driving state
resistance. Just as Congress includes states in statutory schemes for many
reasons not related to checking the federal executive, so, too, state actors
will fight with the federal executive for many reasons not related to ensur-
ing that the President is satisfying his Take Care obligation—appealing to
voter interests in the state, safeguarding budgets, generating a name for
themselves in national politics. But whatever the reason they challenge
federal executive policy, it will be in state actors’ interest to cast their
resistance in terms of fidelity to the statute because as a legal matter states
can only trump the federal executive by invoking Congress. They will ac-
cordingly claim fidelity in conversations with the federal executive, in ar-
guments to the courts or Congress, or in appeals to the public at large.
When states stopped cooperating with disability reviews, for instance,
they insisted that the SSA was abusing its statutory mandate.111 When
California has sought waivers under the Clean Air Act, it has frequently
suggested that the Act requires stronger regulation than the EPA is pro-
viding. Most recently, as discussed below,112 California sought to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions, arguing that the Bush Administration had ab-
dicated its statutory duty to do so and the state was thus vindicating con-
111. Court rulings that the SSA’s policy of terminating benefits absent current
evidence of disability was unlawful bolstered the states’ claim. See, e.g., Patti v. Schweiker,
669 F.2d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding disability claimants entitled to presumption that
disability still exists); see also Derthick, supra note 86, at 45–46 (suggesting judicial rulings R
encouraged state defiance).
112. See infra notes 128–134 and accompanying text. R
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gressional intent.113 Arizona has similarly presented its bid to enforce fed-
eral immigration law as vindicating congressional intent against an
executive branch bent on underenforcing the law.114
When a state argues that it is Congress’s superior agent, this forces
the federal executive to do the same. In any given case, either the state or
the federal executive may in fact have a stronger claim of fidelity. In other
words, states need not actually be Congress’s faithful agents. What mat-
ters is that, with two agents, each will be pushed to claim Congress’s man-
tle. Counteracting the tendency of federal statutes to take on a life of
their own in the executive branch, the resulting competition between
Congress’s two agents can restore the focus of administration to Congress
and to the initial grant of statutory authority, a focus that is salutary even
in the case of ambiguous statutes and broad delegation by Congress.
The litigation concerning Arizona’s immigration law offers a vivid
example of how each of the legislature’s two agents may strive to present
itself as the superior agent. To stop Arizona’s challenge, the federal exec-
utive branch has sued, arguing that the state law is preempted. But this
has required the federal executive to justify its enforcement policy, and in
particular the ways in which it may not enforce the immigration laws to
their fullest extent, with reference to Congress’s purposes. The resulting
legal battle is a contest between the federal executive and Arizona to es-
tablish which is truer to congressional intent. The federal executive—
speaking in the voice of the “United States” as the branch of the govern-
ment responsible for litigation115—argues that its enforcement priorities
are consistent with Congress’s purposes.116 Arizona, meanwhile, insists
113. E.g., California Mandates Cleaner Cars by 2009, Ethics Newsline (July 29, 2002),
http://www.globalethics.org/newsline/2002/07/29/california-mandates-cleaner-cars-by-
2009 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,
505 n.2 (2007) (involving California as petitioner).
114. E.g., Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 100, at 1, 2010 WL 5162518 (“The R
Department of Homeland Security . . . has demonstrated its inability (or unwillingness) to
enforce the federal immigration laws effectively. The Act’s primary purpose, therefore, is
to enhance the assistance Arizona and its law enforcement officers provide in enforcing
federal immigration laws.”). This Article has focused on section 2 of S.B. 1070, but other
provisions of the law have a similar cast. For instance, section 3 makes it a state criminal
offense for an alien in Arizona to violate federal laws that require aliens to carry
registration cards or certificates or to apply for registration. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-
1509(B) (2010). Arizona’s lawmaking power has thus been marshaled not to define a new
offense but rather to provide new penalties for, and a greater guarantee of enforcement of,
provisions that are already on the federal books.
115. But see Brief of Amici Curiae Congressmen Ed Royce et al., supra note 100, at 3 R
(pointedly calling appellee “Department of Justice”); id. at 4 (arguing use of term “federal
government” is deliberate mischaracterization “to establish a foundation for [the] claim
that the President has authority not only to not enforce the immigration laws passed by
Congress but to thwart state efforts to enforce the very laws enacted pursuant to the
plenary authority of Congress”).
116. E.g., Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of Law in
Support Thereof at 13, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No.
2:10-cv-01413-NVW), 2010 WL 2959365.
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that the federal executive is betraying Congress by underenforcing the
federal immigration laws. Supported by some members of Congress and
several other states as amici, the state insists that its law is true to congres-
sional intent and a needed corrective to a willful executive.117
As this underscores, Congress’s use of two agents in the realm of
immigration law encourages each to check the other’s fidelity to
Congress. To be sure, the federal executive branch and the states are not
equally empowered; states are at best junior partners in enforcing federal
immigration law.118 But because Congress has given states a role in en-
forcing immigration law, they are in a position to challenge the federal
executive’s exercise of its authority and to claim to represent Congress in
so doing.
More generally, by giving two different actors some role in a statutory
scheme, whether or not these roles are identical or commensurate,
Congress bakes competition into the scheme. Each agent has the incen-
tive and ability to monitor the other, and, when they disagree, to claim
that it is the superior agent of Congress. Indeed, the virtues of empower-
ing two agents are touted in the administrative law literature concerning
overlapping delegations of power by Congress to multiple federal admin-
istrative agencies. Here, too, commentators argue, competition can help
keep administration focused on the underlying statute.119 But to the ex-
tent one is concerned about the eclipse of federal legislative authority
with executive authority, states may be superior co-agents. When
Congress divides authority across two or more federal agencies, these
agencies answer to two principals, Congress and the President, and the
President is usually a stronger principal. One of the President’s greatest
claims of authority over the administrative state is the responsibility to
117. E.g., Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 100, at 2 (“The fundamental premise R
of the United States’ argument is that DHS has exclusive authority to determine whether
and to what extent it may receive assistance from state and local authorities in the
enforcement of federal immigration laws. The United States’ position, however, is
contradicted by express directives from Congress . . . .”); Brief of Amici Curiae of Members
of Congress Brian Bilbray et al. at 3, Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (No. 10-16645), 2010 WL
5162520 (“The heart of the Administration’s claims against sections 2 and 3 of S.B. 1070 is
that those provisions seek to enforce federal provisions that the Executive chooses either
not to enforce, or to enforce selectively.”); Brief of Amici Curiae States of Michigan et al. at
8, Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (No. 10-16645), 2010 WL 5162508 (“[A] State enforcing
Congress’s intent too well cannot violate Congress’s intent.”).
118. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3) (2006) (providing state officers’ performance of
various immigration functions “shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the
Attorney General”).
119. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in
Administrative Law, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 212 (“Giving authority to multiple agencies
and allowing them to compete against each other can bring policy closer to the
preferences of Congress than would delegation to a single agent.”); Oliver A. Houck &
Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of
Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1242, 1255
(1995) (discussing how Clean Water Act’s empowerment of both EPA and Army Corps of
Engineers keeps administrators focused on statute).
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reconcile overlapping and interdependent provisions of federal law,120
and when federal agencies are fighting, this authority is at its height.
Granting two different federal executive branch actors authority to ad-
minister a statute may therefore increase the likelihood that the
President will drive agency policy.121 Furnishing authority to the federal
executive and the states does not similarly enhance presidential power
because the states do not answer to the President. The only principal the
states and the federal executive branch have in common in such schemes
(besides the ultimate principal, the people) is Congress, so their competi-
tion revolves around Congress.
There may be something particularly fitting about the way coopera-
tive federalism furthers congressional authority. Congress is the branch
of the federal government designed to represent state interests.122 When
states rely on powers granted to them by Congress to champion congres-
sional authority, the relationship comes full circle. Indeed, we see a varia-
tion on the classic political safeguards of federalism argument: If
Wechsler and his followers suggest members of Congress use congres-
sional authority to safeguard federalism, the argument here suggests
members of Congress, whether deliberately or incidentally, may use fed-
eralism to safeguard congressional authority.
3. Reinvigorating Horizontal Checks. — When a state and the federal
executive fight and each claims Congress’s mantle, pressure mounts to
settle the dispute. Sometimes, the state and the federal executive may be
able to reach consensus about how to execute the law. In other instances,
the state or the federal executive will call on an external arbiter: the
courts or Congress. Concurrent delegation to state and federal agents
thus may safeguard the separation of powers not only by pushing states
and their federal executive counterparts to focus attention on Congress,
120. See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral
Action, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 132, 143 (1999) (“The president’s proper role . . . is to rise
above a myopic focus on each statute in isolation . . . and to resolve statutory conflicts by
balancing their competing requirements. All of this affords him enormous discretion to
impose his own priorities on government unilaterally . . . .”).
121. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory
Space, 125 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 5) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (“Fragmented delegations . . . present [the President] with opportunities to
put his stamp on policy.”); id. (manuscript at 29, 42–44) (arguing in favor of President’s
coordinating agency action by directing interagency consultation and exerting centralized
oversight of agency policymaking and implementation). But cf. Rachel E. Barkow,
Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15, 52
(2010) (noting Congress may grant administrative role to multiple agencies to increase
costs of presidential coordination and control).
122. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L.
Rev. 543, 546–52 (1954) (describing states’ role in selecting members of Congress); see
also Clark, supra note 4, at 1342–46, 1357–67 (discussing Senate’s particular role in R
representing states).
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but also by making it more likely that the other two branches of the fed-
eral government will check the federal executive.
a. Courts. — Turning to the courts is one way for a state to vindicate
its view of the law when it clashes with the federal executive. In some
instances, the state will not turn to the judiciary itself, but rather force the
federal executive to call on the judiciary to halt a state challenge. Which
actor turns to the courts will depend on which has the power to set the
agenda absent a court ruling. When a state is seeking a waiver to regulate
differently from the federal executive and such a waiver is denied, it will
be the state that calls on the courts as allies. When a state seeks to com-
mandeer the resources of the federal executive through the incorpora-
tion of federal law, it will be the federal executive that turns to the courts
to vindicate its view of the statutory scheme.123
Because of their resources, political might, and access to information
about the administration of a statutory scheme, states will be more formi-
dable opponents than most litigants suing the federal executive. States’
role in challenging Social Security disability reviews in court offers an ex-
treme example. Many private parties challenged the SSA’s policy regard-
ing continuing disability reviews, but, although the courts repeatedly held
the SSA’s decisions unlawful, the agency announced a policy of nonacqui-
escence.124 By bringing lawsuits on behalf of all interested parties in the
state, states were able to tame the agency’s policy of nonacquiescence in a
way individual litigants could not.125
123. In still other instances, state-federal competition will not yield administrative
problems that push the state or the federal executive to call on the courts; diverging in
particular will frequently not manifest as a clash. But private parties who are subject to
different state and federal regimes, or who are subject to only one of these regimes but
prefer the alternative, may bring a legal challenge. E.g., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.
v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (considering suit by Chamber of Commerce and
National Automobile Dealers Association challenging California’s receipt of Clean Air Act
waiver to regulate greenhouse gas emissions).
124. See generally Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by
Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 Yale L.J. 679, 692–704 (1989) (describing SSA
nonacquiescence). The agency cited separation of powers principles in declaring that it
would respect court judgments in individual cases but otherwise continue to apply its
regulations. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-618, at 24 (1984) (statement of Associate Comm’r for
Hearings and Appeals, Social Security Administration) (“Federal courts do not run SSA’s
programs.”); SSR 82-10c, 1982 WL 31431 (Jan. 1, 1982) (nonacquiescence letter)
(rescinded without replacement); SSR 82-49c, 1982 WL 31432 (Jan. 1, 1982)
(nonacquiescence letter) (rescinded without replacement). The courts responded, “Far
from raising questions of judicial interference in executive actions, [the policy of
nonacquiescence] presents the reverse constitutional problem: the executive branch
defying the courts and undermining what are perhaps the fundamental precepts of our
constitutional system—the separation of powers and respect for the law.” Lopez v. Heckler,
725 F.2d 1489, 1497 (9th Cir. 1984).
125. See Derthick, supra note 86, at 150 (discussing New York class action). By ceasing R
to cooperate with the SSA, the states thus cast themselves not only as agents of Congress,
but also as agents of the federal courts, vindicating judicial rulings against a recalcitrant
federal agency.
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Massachusetts v. EPA’s broad recognition of state standing further
suggests that states may be able to bring lawsuits in the first instance
where private parties cannot.126 While the Court has limited private ac-
tors’ standing to contest many executive branch decisions, state chal-
lenges to the federal executive confer a sort of political legitimacy on
judicial intervention, as the Court casts itself as a neutral arbitrator be-
tween two political bodies.127 Yet even as Massachusetts may suggest a
broad role for states in challenging federal executive action—and federal
executive inaction—the case underscores that states are better positioned
to launch such challenges when they are granted a role in administering
federal law than when they are appealing from outside the federal
scheme. Consider, by comparison to the Massachusetts lawsuit,
California’s attempt to regulate greenhouse gas emissions itself when it
argued the Bush Administration was abdicating its statutory duty to do
so—a situation involving the same basic facts and many of the same play-
ers (including California) as Massachusetts. When, for the first time in his-
tory, the EPA rejected in full California’s request for a waiver,128 the state
filed suit. Ultimately, the dispute was resolved outside the courts when
the presidency changed hands,129 but a consideration of how the state’s
lawsuit might have unfolded helps illuminate how California is uniquely
positioned to call on the courts because of the role Congress has given it.
First, whereas the Supreme Court’s recognition of Massachusetts’s
standing was unusual—and judicial recognition of enhanced state stand-
126. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007) (discussing Court’s “special
solicitude” for state interests).
127. Indeed, in Massachusetts, the Court not only recognized broad state standing, but
also reviewed a form of executive inaction—the denial of a rulemaking petition—that
many believed would not be justiciable, and subjected this form of inaction to hard look
review. Id. at 527–35. The fact that the petitioners were states seemed central to the
Court’s bending of administrative law doctrine. A role for states in ratcheting up judicial
review of the executive branch also surfaced in Gonzales v. Oregon, in which the Court
refused to grant Auer, Chevron, or even Skidmore deference to an Attorney General
interpretive rule. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256–75 (2006). Gillian Metzger has
suggested that Massachusetts and Gonzales reveal administrative law to be the new
federalism, with the Court both applying administrative law doctrines to ensure state
prerogatives are considered and developing some extraordinary federalism-inspired
administrative law analyses. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism,
57 Duke L.J. 2023, 2029–72 (2008). Metzger is clearly on to something. But a sort of
reverse claim also seems true: The Court was not only seeking to protect the states; it was
also looking to the states to justify its own stringent review of executive branch action. Cf.
Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 25–34
(2011) (arguing three preemption cases from 2008 Term suggest Court was looking to
states to improve federal agency performance).
128. Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption, 73 Fed. Reg.
12,156, 12,159–69 (Mar. 6, 2008) (reasoning California did not need its standards to meet
compelling and extraordinary conditions). Since 1970, California has been granted over
fifty waivers of preemption; this was the first complete denial. See Notice of Decision
Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744, 32,745 (July 8, 2009).
129. See Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption, 74 Fed.
Reg. at 32,783 (granting California waiver).
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ing may well not persist130—California would necessarily have standing to
challenge the waiver denial. In Massachusetts, the Court suggested that
because states have been cut out of the federal scheme, standing was ap-
propriate as a sort of compensation for states’ powerlessness,131 but
California’s standing would follow from Congress’s inclusion of the state
in the regulatory scheme—in other words, from the state’s statutory au-
thority, not its lack thereof. Second, California would be seeking review of
the agency’s denial of its own ability to act, even as this question would
necessarily implicate the agency’s refusal to regulate, so judicial review
would not be curtailed by doctrine limiting challenges to administrative
inaction.132 And while a court ruling for Massachusetts would only force
the EPA to reconsider its decision under a statutory standard that vests
significant discretion in the Administrator,133 a court ruling for
California would allow the state to effectively replace the EPA, standing in
for a federal agency the state deemed to be disregarding its statutory
obligation.134
The ability of states that are included in federal statutory schemes to
effectively force judicial review of federal executive inaction is further ap-
parent in the case of Arizona’s immigration law. Here, it is the federal
executive that has sued to enjoin the state law. But as part of its preemp-
tion argument, the executive must explain why the enforcement priori-
ties it has established are consistent with federal law. Typically, this sort of
question is not justiciable; an agency’s priorities and the manner in which
it marshals its resources to carry out federal law are issues courts usually
do not evaluate.135 These issues effectively become justiciable, however,
130. See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to
Expertise, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 51, 70 (“It is not clear which if any components of the Court’s
standing analysis will generalize beyond this case. There is reason to think that ‘special
solicitude’ in particular will be limited and short-lived . . . .”).
131. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519 (“When a State enters the Union, it surrenders
certain sovereign prerogatives. . . . These sovereign prerogatives are now lodged in the
Federal Government, and Congress has ordered EPA to protect Massachusetts (among
others) . . . .”).
132. Specifically, a court considering California’s challenge would have determined
whether the state had shown “compelling and extraordinary” conditions to merit a waiver.
See, e.g., Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption, 73 Fed. Reg.
at 12,159–69 (considering whether California had established the existence of compelling
and extraordinary conditions). Although a decision holding California entitled to a waiver
would be distinct from a ruling that the EPA should itself regulate certain emissions, it
would also amount to a challenge to agency inaction because EPA’s denial of a waiver
effectively mandates inaction as the only statutory policy for both federal and state actors.
133. Indeed, despite the Supreme Court’s ruling for Massachusetts, the EPA did not
conduct a rulemaking concerning greenhouse gas emissions during the Bush
Administration.
134. See Barron, supra note 24, at 1145–48 (suggesting California could substitute for R
a missing federal administrative voice and if Court performed expertise-forcing review it
applied in Massachusetts to California’s challenge to waiver denial, EPA likely would lose).
135. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 827–35 (1985) (describing agency
decisions not to pursue enforcement action as presumptively unreviewable).
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because Congress has given the states a role in the federal scheme,
thereby at least arguably depriving the executive branch of its monopoly
over enforcement decisions.
b. Congress. — When Congress’s state and federal agents find them-
selves at loggerheads over the administration of a statute, they may also
appeal to their principal. As suggested above, one advantage of concur-
rent delegation is that each agent will monitor the other’s actions and
force it to justify its preferred course in terms of the underlying statute. In
other words, concurrent delegation may be especially useful when
Congress is not up to the task of monitoring its agents itself. But that does
not mean the states and the federal executive will not turn to Congress.
To the contrary, their monitoring will often lead them to seek congres-
sional oversight or correction.
To put it somewhat differently, when they are included in federal
schemes, states may generate particularly effective fire alarms.136 As many
have noted, a key way in which Congress oversees administrative action is
by relying on interested parties to bring concerns to its attention.137 For
instance, regulated parties or specialized nonprofit groups may complain
to Congress about proposed agency action, and Congress may then hold
oversight hearings, threaten budget cuts, or even pass new legislation.
States charged with partially administering a federal scheme are in a par-
ticularly good position to sound such alarms because they have the incen-
tive, opportunity, and expertise to monitor federal executive action—and
the ability to get Congress to listen to them.
First, states have a strong incentive to monitor the federal executive
branch insofar as its actions affect their own ability to carry out desired
policies. In many instances, such monitoring will simply be the byproduct
of a state attempt to administer federal law as the state would like. No
extra effort on the part of the states was required for them to notice that
the Reagan Administration was conducting disability reviews in a particu-
lar way, for California to notice that the Bush Administration was not
regulating greenhouse gases, or for Arizona to notice that the Obama
Administration has not been enforcing immigration laws to their fullest
possible extent.
Second, because they are embedded in the statutory scheme, states
have a privileged opportunity to monitor the federal executive and to
furnish Congress with information about the administration of a statute.
For instance, Arizona’s officers who are deputized to help carry out immi-
gration law have firsthand knowledge about how DHS enforces federal
immigration law. A frequent obstacle to effective congressional oversight
of executive branch action is a lack of information. In extreme cases, the
President’s control over information and assertions of privilege may limit
136. Federal agencies may also generate fire alarms regarding state administration in
much the same way states may generate alarms regarding federal administration.
137. E.g., Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 165, 166–67 (1984).
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the ability of Congress to engage in oversight at all.138 But even when
there is not a concerted effort by the executive to withhold information
from Congress, it may be difficult for legislators to find a toehold that
facilitates effective oversight or provides a basis for corrective legislation.
States are not the only parties that can provide helpful information, but,
to the extent they are embedded within a statutory scheme, they may
have a particularly good opportunity to collect information.
Third, and related, states often have expertise that helps them to
monitor the federal executive and to frame information about the admin-
istration of federal law for nonspecialist legislators. With respect to con-
tinuing disability reviews, for instance, state officials testified repeatedly
before Congress, providing legislators with concrete information about
how the program was being carried out that boosted efforts to pass cor-
rective legislation.139 When California adopted regulations for green-
house gas emissions, it could furnish specific, expert information about
how such regulations would work.140
States may be in a good position not only to monitor federal execu-
tive action, but also to make persuasive appeals to Congress. One need
not endorse the political safeguards of federalism theory with respect to
judicial review to appreciate that state actors may make especially strong
entreaties to the members of Congress charged with representing their
interests.141 Because of the ties that bind state actors and their congres-
sional representatives, state actors are likely to have their concerns taken
seriously. And when these ties are not enough, states’ particular ability to
appeal to the public and to harness the power of the media helps them to
get legislators’ attention.
States may also be able to engage a different group of legislators than
might pay attention to a particular agency’s action in the normal course.
A common concern about congressional oversight is that only one part of
Congress, usually a committee or subcommittee, will monitor agency ac-
tion, and this committee or subcommittee may have different views from
Congress as a whole.142 If state actors take issue with the federal execu-
tive’s administration of the law, however, they may complain to their state
representatives regardless of what committees these individuals sit on.
Particularly if many states complain, they may therefore be able to mobil-
138. Marshall, Eleven Reasons, supra note 17, at 520. R
139. See, e.g., Derthick, supra note 86, at 162 (discussing state representatives’ R
testimony and provision of studies by Massachusetts legislature and Michigan task force).
140. See, e.g., State Agency Greenhouse Gas Reduction Report Card, available at
http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/climate_action_team/reports/2012_CalEPA_Report_
Card.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
141. See, e.g., Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 Duke L.J. 749,
761–68, 784–88 (1999) (arguing Congress’s political constituencies create special
incentives to cater to state interests).
142. See supra note 73 (discussing oversight by committees and subcommittees). R
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ize Congress, yielding not only oversight but in some cases new laws, such
as the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984.143
In short, although state administration of federal law does not ne-
gate the pathologies that afflict Congress, it can make Congress more
likely to pay attention, to have the information it needs, and to be moti-
vated to correct the administration of federal law. Cooperative federalism
schemes thus may not only restore the focus of administration to
Congress but also engage Congress itself in administrative oversight.
IV. A REALISTIC RESPONSE
Cooperative federalism is not an ideal response to threats to the sep-
aration of powers. It is a realistic one. In several important respects, coop-
erative federalism schemes seize on attributes of our administrative state
that are widely thought to undermine separation of powers values and
recast these stubborn problems as solutions. In particular, such schemes
respond organically to the two threats to the separation of powers can-
vassed in Part I: the rise of federal executive power in the administrative
state and the rise of political parties.
A. Expansion as a Check
Perhaps the most oft-cited reason for the rise of federal executive
power is the growth of the administrative state and the sheer amount of
policymaking and execution that is entrusted to the federal executive.144
Cooperative federalism schemes are a practical, even organic, response to
this development, as states provide a check on executive power because
of, not in spite of, the growth of the federal executive branch.
The very rise of the executive branch has meant the incorporation
into its operations of a variety of actors who are not a part of it. In particu-
lar, the more Congress tasks the federal executive with accomplishing,
the more likely it is to involve the states in a statutory scheme. But even as
states in some sense become a part of the federal apparatus, they remain
distinct entities, populated by actors with interests and motivations differ-
ent from those of the federal executive.145 In this way, the expansion of
the executive branch presents a separation of powers solution even as it
presents a separation of powers problem: The federal executive may be
checked from within its own domain.146 The fact that the federal execu-
143. Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
144. See supra notes 16–29 and accompanying text. R
145. See generally Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 5, at 1270–71 (arguing state R
officials in cooperative federalism schemes serve “two masters”); Andrzej Rapaczynski,
From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 341, 386–95 (exploring how state and national constituencies have interests likely to
clash).
146. This Article is not the first to suggest that separation of powers values may be
furthered within the executive’s domain, but past commentators have focused only on the
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tive’s broad mandate requires co-administration with the states positions
the states to challenge federal executive power, and the broader the exec-
utive’s mandate, the more room there may be for state challenges in the
realm of administration.
Indeed, as canvassed above,147 cooperative federalism schemes may
generate a particularly robust check on federal executive power when
Congress has delegated broadly to the executive. Delegation is typically
regarded as enhancing executive power. When Congress grants open-
ended administrative authority to the federal executive alone, the execu-
tive has substantial power to make policy and carry out the law as it sees
fit. But when Congress grants open-ended authority to both the states
and the federal executive, states have substantial power to challenge the
federal executive. Cooperative federalism schemes can thus transform a
common source of executive power into a check on executive power.
The check furnished by states in cooperative federalism schemes is
especially noteworthy from a separation of powers perspective insofar as it
not only limits federal executive power but also fosters the sort of vigor-
ous, visible public debate about federal law that our horizontal system of
checks and balances aspires to generate.148 When states fight with the
federal executive, they frequently appeal to the public about whether the
executive is really representing the people’s will. For instance,
California’s challenge to the federal executive’s environmental policy and
Arizona’s challenge to its immigration policy have played out not only in
courtrooms, but also in media across the country.149
Such competition regarding federal law thus reproduces within the
executive’s domain benefits of divided representation typically associated
with the split of authority between the federal legislative and executive
branches. The federal executive cannot unproblematically claim to be
the people’s “true” representative even within its sphere of competence,
for the states speak for the people as much as it does. This sort of “fractal
federal executive branch and thus not considered the full extent of this domain. For two
accounts of “internal separation of powers,” see generally Katyal, supra note 17, and M. R
Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 603 (2001). Magill argues that power is significantly fragmented and diffused within
the branches of the federal government, so the concentration of power in a particular
branch is not a concern. Magill, supra, at 653–54. Arguing that “[t]ime has not been kind”
to Magill’s claim of sufficient internal fragmentation, Katyal advocates for a more robust
system of internal checks to constrain federal executive power. Katyal, supra note 17, at R
2322 n.21.
147. See supra notes 102–108 and accompanying text. R
148. See generally Ackerman, We the People, supra note 15, at 183–86 (describing R
how each branch of federal government represents the people in a different way and
disputes among branches thus emphasize problematic nature of each branch’s effort to
speak for the people).
149. See, e.g., Marc Lacey, Injunction on Arizona Is Upheld: Appeals Court Rules in
Immigration Case, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 2011, at A12 (“‘This battle is a battle of epic
proportions . . . about a state’s right to enforce the laws of this land . . . .’” (quoting
Arizona State Senator Russell K. Pearce)).
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separation of powers”—the recursive reproduction of separation of pow-
ers values within the executive’s domain—is possible precisely because
the administrative domain has expanded to include the states as well as
the federal executive.
The fact that states provide a check on federal executive power be-
cause of the growth of the federal executive branch highlights that there
is another story here, too, one about federalism rather than the separa-
tion of powers. The rise of the executive branch is closely related to the
shift of authority from the states to the federal government: State powers
assumed by the federal government have enlarged the federal executive’s
scope of activity.150 But as the federal government has sought to exercise
its magnified authority, it has turned to the states as necessary administra-
tors of federal law. States may have lost much of their authority as sepa-
rate sovereigns since the New Deal, but they have gained authority as ad-
ministrators of federal law. Although this Article focuses on the
separation of powers, the account of federalism as a safeguard of the sep-
aration of powers thus complicates not only the narrative of the rise of
the executive branch, but also the narrative of the rise of federal over
state authority. State power may have been transformed, more than lost,
as the federal government has grown.151
B. Partisanship as a Check
Cooperative federalism schemes also represent a practical response
to the rise of executive power in that they harness the strength of political
parties to generate a continual check on the federal executive.
An important strand of recent separation of powers scholarship be-
moans the way in which partisan politics has eclipsed the branches as
such in channeling political competition.152 In particular, commentators
worry that when a single party controls Congress and the presidency, in-
terbranch competition dissipates and, among other things, there is no
meaningful check on the executive. Those concerned about the party
substitute for powers regard polarized and cohesive political parties as a
particular threat and have put forward proposals to prevent strong parties
from taking hold.153 But cooperative federalism may be a more practical
way to stimulate competition because it follows from strong parties in-
stead of resisting them.
150. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“Vast accretions of federal power, eroded from that reserved by
the States, have magnified the scope of presidential activity.”).
151. See generally Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 5 (exploring how cooperative R
federalism schemes may further values traditionally associated with sovereignty model of
federalism).
152. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text. R
153. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 30, at 2379–85 (suggesting strategies such as R
ending safe districts and making greater use of open primaries).
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Simply put, there will never be party unity between the federal exec-
utive and all fifty states.154 Just as political parties have overwhelmed
branch affiliation, so too have they overwhelmed the state versus national
affiliation of politicians.155 Because there will never be unified party gov-
ernment between the federal executive and all of the states, however, the
rise of partisanship does not have the same consequences for the separa-
tion of powers and federalism. They may be motivated by partisanship
more than a commitment to state authority, but at least some states can
nonetheless be counted on to disagree with federal policy.156 Even in
times of unified federal government, that is, partisan rivalry should lead
Republican-dominated states to challenge decisions of Democratic ad-
ministrations, and vice versa.157 For example, a Democratic state legisla-
ture pushed to regulate greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to the Clean
Air Act when a Republican administration refused to do so, and a state
controlled by a Republican legislature and executive has leveled the pri-
mary challenge to immigration policy pursued by a Democratic
administration.
Cooperative federalism may usefully check the federal executive not
only in times of unified federal government, but also in times of divided
government. One might object that this takes the logic of checking too
far. Perhaps, that is, administrative competition is a second-best option
when party unity has dampened interbranch competition, but when
there is already party-based competition between the federal legislative
and executive branches, we should not layer on administrative competi-
154. This may be due to more than the fact of fifty states with varying constituencies,
as there is a historical pattern of backlash against the President’s party in state midterm
legislative and gubernatorial elections. Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, The
President: Lightning Rod or King?, 115 Yale L.J. 2611, 2621 (2006) (citing sources).
155. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 219 (2000) [hereinafter Kramer, Putting the Politics
Back] (“Party politics . . . complicated what the Founders had erroneously assumed would
be a permanent and natural antagonism between state and national politicians. Within less
than a decade, cross-system connections established through the incipient parties
rendered the state governments unreliable watchdogs over federal activity.”).
156. Indeed, Kramer’s example of how parties quickly rendered states unreliable
watchdogs, id., shows that two states, Virginia and Kentucky, led the fight against the Alien
and Sedition Acts, even though the remaining states did not join the cause because they
were controlled by Federalists. Id. at 275.
157. Cf. Barkow, supra note 157, at 57 (“[T]he fifty state AGs will undoubtedly R
represent different parties, so even if an administration is in power that is partial to
business interests, there is likely an AG of the opposite party who is more sympathetic to
consumer claims.”); Colin Provost, State Attorneys General, Entrepreneurship, and
Consumer Protection in the New Federalism, Publius, Spring 2003, at 37–38, 40 (observing
partisan differences in state AG behavior).  Insofar as cooperative federalism schemes seize
simultaneously on the power of partisanship and the power of administration, they might
therefore be considered a merger of two proposed institutional responses to unified
federal government: creating minority opposition rights within the bureaucracy.  See
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 30, at 2368–79 (proposing minority opposition rights and R
insulated bureaucracy).
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tion. While state challenges present costs that should not be overlooked,
there are two reasons to think that they can be salutary even in times of
divided government.
First, one effect of the extreme competition that manifests in times
of party division, gridlock, may push the executive to rely on broad dele-
gations that remain in effect from prior Congresses. While it may ramp
up legislative oversight, “Congress will have limited recourse against an
opposite-party executive empowered by broad delegations.”158 But states
may have recourse. As discussed above,159 a particular benefit of coopera-
tive federalism schemes is that they foster competition even when—per-
haps especially when—the executive relies on open-ended grants of au-
thority. Including states within federal schemes thus furnishes a check on
the executive when it relies on outstanding delegations the current
Congress would curtail if it could.
Second, to the extent there is competition around administration
between the legislative and executive branches in times of divided govern-
ment, state-federal disagreements may look quite different. When govern-
ment divides, congressional oversight will often take the form of broad-
gauged, rhetorical battles designed to win political points, not fine-
grained disputes about policy details. When state and federal administra-
tors disagree about how to execute federal law, their competition may
assume a more practical cast, focusing on the sorts of interstitial questions
that disputes between Congress and the federal executive elide.
Cooperative federalism schemes may be a particularly realistic re-
sponse to the rise of executive power not only because such schemes seize
on the power of partisanship to check the executive, but also because
strong political parties should be a boon to such schemes themselves. As
Larry Kramer has argued, the party ties that bind state and federal politi-
cians may make members of Congress more sensitive to state pre-
rogatives.160 On Kramer’s account, the role political parties play in build-
ing relationships among politicians is what matters: Democratic
Congresspersons may be inclined to protect state prerogatives because of
their relationships with state Democratic parties, and Republican
Congresspersons because of their relationships with state Republican par-
ties, but this should in the aggregate lead Congress to attend to state
prerogatives. If this is so, party politics may safeguard not only state au-
tonomy, but also states’ role in administering federal law. To the extent
state politicians want to administer portions of federal law, that is, their
connections to federal legislators should help insure they are included in
federal schemes. And the stronger the parties, the stronger these connec-
tions between state and federal politicians should be, leading to coopera-
158. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 30, at 2359–60. R
159. See supra notes 102–108 and accompanying text. R
160. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back, supra note 155, at 278–87. R
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tive federalism schemes that, in turn, introduce a check on the federal
executive into the administration of federal law.
*  *  *
Political parties channel not only competition but also cooperation.
The fact that all fifty states will never be controlled by a single political
party thus suggests that, at any given time, the federal executive may
forge partisan alliances with the states as well as face partisan resistance
from them. This point calls attention to a broader one that cuts to the
heart of the argument of this Article. Cooperative federalism schemes
may, in some instances, not check federal executive power but enhance
it. States and the federal executive may collaborate rather than compete.
Sometimes, they may even collude to challenge congressional authority.
In focusing on an overlooked way in which cooperative federalism
schemes advance the separation of powers, this Article does not seek to
deny such cross-cutting tendencies, which merit further exploration. Yet
even as the above discussion of partisanship suggests ways that coopera-
tive federalism schemes might enhance federal executive power, it also
underscores why they should never just do that. To the extent the federal
executive is able to find allies among the states, it will also find oppo-
nents. And, for one concerned about the already-significant power of the
federal executive, the opponents should weigh in the balance more than
the allies.
More generally, cooperative federalism schemes should reliably gen-
erate a check on the federal executive because of the diversity of actors
they incorporate. States have different interests and constituencies both
from the federal executive branch and from each other. Cooperative fed-
eralism thus yokes the laboratory aspect of federalism to the administra-
tion of federal law, generating variegated competition regarding how fed-
eral law is executed.161
CONCLUSION
States, this Article argues, check the exercise of federal executive
power in an era of expansive executive power, and they do so as champi-
ons of Congress, both relying on congressionally conferred authority and
casting themselves as Congress’s faithful agents. When they disagree with
the federal executive about how to administer federal law, states force
attention back to the underlying statute: Contending that their view is
consistent with Congress’s purposes, states compel the federal executive
161. Cf. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk-Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism
Promote Innovation?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 593, 614–16 (1980) (suggesting states are generally
unlikely to innovate but cooperative federalism makes innovation somewhat more likely);
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41
UCLA L. Rev. 903, 923–26 (1994) (arguing most significant state experimentation in
recent years has been organized by national government).
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to respond in kind. In addition, states may reinvigorate horizontal checks
by calling on the courts or Congress as allies. State administration of fed-
eral law may be a particularly realistic means of checking federal execu-
tive power because instead of fighting problems commentators empha-
size—a vast administrative state, broad delegations to the executive
branch, and powerful political parties—cooperative federalism harnesses
these realities to further separation of powers objectives.
Because cooperative federalism has been largely overlooked as a
means of safeguarding the separation of powers, additional descriptive
and normative work remains to be done to develop a full-fledged theory.
Perhaps most important, this Article explores how states check the fed-
eral executive while advancing congressional authority, but this is not the
only way cooperative federalism schemes may influence the separation of
powers. Additional attention to the varied ways state administration of
federal law affects the components of the federal government—in partic-
ular, ways cooperative federalism schemes may enhance federal executive
power—will help to develop the theory and to illustrate its limits.
Moreover, this Article focuses on checks and balances, in the form of
competition among government actors, but further attention to other
separation of powers values is warranted. Some such values, such as en-
ergy and efficiency, pose tradeoffs with the values identified here and
may be threatened, rather than advanced, by cooperative federalism
schemes. Other separation of powers values may be furthered in quite
different respects by state administration of federal law. For instance, co-
operative federalism schemes may usefully advance the formal separation
of particular powers. While it is commonplace to assert that the power to
make the law must be separated from the power to execute it,162 the rise
of federal agencies with policymaking and execution authority poses a
well-recognized challenge to this tenet. Some cooperative federalism
schemes may assign policymaking, a variant of lawmaking, to the federal
executive branch and execution to the states, thereby advancing a more
robust separation between these two functions than is possible in the fed-
eral executive branch alone.163
Other cooperative federalism schemes may advance a different vision
of separated powers by restoring the role of legislators, rather than execu-
tive branch actors, as policymakers. One argument for separating powers
162. See, e.g., Ackerman, New Separation, supra note 30, at 689 (“The power to make R
laws must be separated from the power to implement them. If politicians are allowed to
breach this barrier, the result will be tyranny. Although we may pretty this conclusion up
with a citation from Madison or Montesquieu, it is simple common sense.”).
163. For instance, the nation’s major environmental statutes charge the EPA with
establishing pollution standards—a type of policymaking we might consider analogous to
lawmaking—but states then craft implementation plans and administer these standards. 33
U.S.C. §§ 1316, 1318(c), 1342 (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409–7411 (2006). Similarly some
conditional grant schemes contemplate that the states will distribute benefits pursuant to
regulations issued by federal agencies. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (providing for state
distribution of Medicaid benefits).
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by function rather than some other criterion164 is that certain types of
powers are best matched with certain types of decisionmakers.165 But
such normative matchmaking sits uneasily with the rise of the administra-
tive state and the executive’s attendant role in policymaking. In some
cases, cooperative federalism may restore legislative control over poli-
cymaking—in the form of state legislation.166 While state legislatures are
not Congress, if one is concerned about particular kinds of deci-
sionmakers making particular kinds of decisions, state legislators may
serve as well as federal ones. Especially insofar as one is concerned about
the relative power of the popular constituencies represented by each
branch of the federal government,167 state legislatures may be a good
stand-in for Congress, perhaps better than the real thing.
The theory of federalism as a safeguard of the separation of powers
should also move beyond a two-branch theory. This Article treats courts
as arbiters of separation of powers contests involving the legislative and
executive branches, but the judiciary is of course a constitutional branch
in its own right. How might further attention to the judiciary complicate
or reinforce the theory offered here?168 An integrated approach to feder-
alism and the separation of powers also presents a rich opportunity for
164. For instance, authority could be divided not by function but by subject matter.
See Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 Va. L. Rev. 301, 304 (2010) (comparing
separation of functions to “the ‘unbundled powers alternative’: Multiple branches
exercising combined functions in topically limited domains”).
165. Legislative power may be entrusted to Congress so that policy is set by a
deliberative body whose members are subject to frequent and staggered election cycles
that make them responsive to the people; executive power may be vested in the President
to further unified, efficient administration by an elected officer; and judicial power may be
granted to judges who have lifetime tenure and salary protections to ensure their
independence. David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 19, 19.
166. For instance, California’s legislature directed state regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions pursuant to the Clean Air Act, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 43018.5 (West 2006),
precisely the sort of controversial, norm-setting type of decision that critics of the
administrative state argue should be made by deliberative, democratically responsive
legislators.
167. See Nourse, supra note 141, at 766 (arguing separation of powers questions must R
be understood in terms of the relative power of the popular constituencies represented by
the three branches of government); see also Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Separation of powers operates on a vertical axis as well,
between each branch and the citizens in whose interest powers must be exercised.”).
168. For an interesting suggestion about the relationship between federalism and
separation of powers focused on the judiciary, see A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial
Presidency’s New Vestments, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1346, 1357 (1994). Froomkin argues that
“[c]ongressional weakening of federal courts means that the state courts gain, not
Congress itself, and the balance of power among the branches is only tilted, not
destroyed”; thus “federalism works to support the balance of power among the branches.”
Id.
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comparative scholarship169 and for analysis of the relationship between
cooperative federalism and state separation of powers.170
While there is thus much more work to be done, this Article repre-
sents a first step toward developing an integrated account of federalism
and the separation of powers. And there is good reason to expect the role
this Article posits for federalism in safeguarding the separation of powers
will continue to grow. The more Congress tasks the federal executive with
accomplishing, the more likely it is also to grant the states a role in ad-
ministering federal law. For instance, the most ambitious statutes enacted
during President Obama’s tenure—the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act—give important roles to both the federal exec-
utive and the states.171 The theory of federalism as a safeguard of the
separation of powers thus may not only shed new light on a feature of our
current constitutional landscape, but also provide a tool for understand-
ing and evaluating the most important laws of the twenty-first century.
169. Cf. Daniel Halberstam & Roderick M. Hills, Jr., State Autonomy in Germany and
the United States, 574 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 173 (2001) (comparing federalism
in United States and Germany).
170. E.g., Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and Constitutional Duels: Separation of
Powers and State Implementation of Federally Inspired Regulatory Programs and
Standards, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1343 (2005) (considering state separation of powers
issues arising in cooperative federalism schemes); cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the
State: The Use of Federal Law To Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures’
Control, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1201, 1202 (1999) (exploring whether federal law may delegate
power to state institutions against will of state legislature).
171. Among other things, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act gives both
states and the federal executive authority to establish high-risk health insurance pools and
exchanges through which individuals and small businesses may purchase insurance. Pub.
L. No. 111-148, §§ 1101, 1311, 1321, 124 Stat. 119, 141–143, 173–179, 186 (2010) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001, 18031, 18041). See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory
Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health
Reform and Beyond, 121 Yale L.J. 534 (2011) (exploring how Congress uses state
implementers to entrench new national programs, and focusing on the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act). The Dodd-Frank Act, among other things, grants states the
authority to enforce certain regulations promulgated by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau against national banks or federal savings institutions. Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1042(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 2012–14 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552).
